“WINNING ISN’T EVERYTHING”: THE RE-NOMINATION OF LOSING CANDIDATES

by

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“How often were the voters discerning, how often dumb? How frequently were they fooled, and how frequently did they go unerringly to the better man? How often did they elect the apparently superior candidate, only to find that the presidency was the one job in the nation that he could not handle? How often did they choose the man who was more capable of solving the existing problems, only to have a radical change in the course of history render his particular qualities useless and make the defeated one the ideal executive to handle the new situations?”

– Irving Stone, “They Also Ran” (1943).
Dedication

This dissertation is not just the result of my work. Before continuing, I want to say a word for the people in my life who walked along this path with me. First, my family has always given me the support I have needed, regardless of the distance. In good times and especially in bad times, they have been there for me, with a kind word or with advice to get through the struggle. My mom Margarita, my brother José and my sister Jessica are what keeps me going. I know my dad is helping me go on from his own place, too.

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My love to all of you.
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Abstract

Why do parties re-nominate losing candidates? This project develops a comparative theory for losers of elections, who are not a monolithic group of low-quality non-winners. We advance that political parties take note of two moments, one before the election and one after the race. These moments consider the electoral experience and the electoral performance of the candidate, respectively. Thus, we contend that parties treat experienced candidates differently from amateurs, and over-performers differently than under-performers when considering their futures in the electoral arena, despite all being equally losing candidates.

For our empirical chapters, we explore the Chilean legislative elections, where an “insurance policy” mechanism for good losers developed mainly because of the electoral system in place since the return of democracy in 1989. This arrangement consisted of valuable appointments for candidates who were unable to win a legislative seat. Our exploration of the main question is twofold: first, we look at the seven legislative elections from 1989 to 2013, assessing the determinants of re-nomination, along with other outcomes that losing candidates followed. Second, we analyze the use of presidential appointments – to cabinet, embassies, or top regional executive positions – before and after the 2015 electoral reform, comparing the 2017 elections to the period including the seven races under the binominal electoral system.

For the first empirical section, chapter 3, our main finding tells us that losing candidates who over-perform with respect to previous candidates for the same coalition in the same district are re-nominated in greater numbers than all other also-rans. Meanwhile, our
second empirical section shows a continuous use of presidential appointments across both periods, pre and post-reform.

Expanding the understanding of elections to include losing candidates – especially after realizing that some of these unsuccessful politicians come back to win elections – is a pending task for political scientists. We hope this is the start of a more nuanced discussion about the topic, with a framework that can be expanded to other countries. Similarly, these results can be complemented by qualitative studies with interviews to also-rans who are now winners, or to perennial losers, to gauge their strategies after being confronted with electoral defeat.
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**Introduction**

Winners of elections are only one part of the puzzle surrounding popular elections. After races are finished, many party and candidate dynamics occur around losing candidates, and their own chances to stay in politics and develop a career. This project deals with the role of also-rans in politics from two fronts. First, it explores the chances of re-nomination for losing candidates in legislative elections over time. Then, it tests the use of presidential appointments as a reward mechanism for good losers.

For this initial exploration of the often-overlooked role of losing candidates in politics, we focus on the case of Chile. The reasons to choose this country are twofold: on the one hand, the Chilean political landscape provides a stable party system with two strong coalitions wrestling for legislative control for the first seven elections between 1989 and 2013. Then, many scholars have shown that the binominal electoral system for the legislative provided the right incentives for the development of an “insurance policy” arrangement that would provide presidential appointments to good losers of legislative races.

So, this case allows us to first assess the determinants of re-nomination for losing candidates across twenty-five years, and later the use of this pool of also-rans by future presidential administrations to name attractive candidates to positions of executive trust. In addition, the electoral reform passed in 2015 and put into effect for the 2017 legislative elections provides an institutional break, where we can compare how things fare before and after this change for the mechanism of appointments.
The summary of the three chapters is structured as follows: Chapter 1 focuses on developing a comparative theory for losing candidates that takes into consideration the role of parties in their fate. Thus, it separates also-rans by two dimensions – one known before the election and another revealed after races are finished – that follow their electoral experience and their electoral performance, respectively. This means that parties will be nominating amateur and veteran candidates to different seats with distinct expectations for each of them, and after elections are finished, parties will have a tally of their under-performing and over-performing losing politicians.

Touching on literature dealing with repeat challengers, candidate quality, the incumbency advantage, and the nomination of candidates, we present our claims that relate to these two dimensions and how they serve as signals to parties of the standing of their losing politicians. Therefore, we are also helping to explain why parties do not start over with all-new challengers across districts after elections are finished. We contend that the experience is a valuable ex-ante consideration, while performance becomes a significant ex-post marker which makes candidates stand out in the pool of losing candidates that parties have at their disposal at the end of a race.

In Chapter 2 we justify the selection of Chile as our case study in more detail, and later set our expectations with this project. In general, we expect both dimensions to significantly affect the way parties see their candidates, which in turn will affect their future chances of staying in electoral politics or possibly being appointed to a position of presidential trust. Thus, and despite an electoral setback, experienced candidates will be thought of as having a greater know-how than amateur politicians, given a greater leeway when thinking about future chances. Meanwhile, electoral over-performers will...
send a more positive signal to a party that they are attractive candidates and they deserve a future nod.

Later, Chapter 3 puts the first claim to the test, and we establish the cut points for our two categories of losing candidates. First, we think of amateurs as candidates without previous experience in legislative elections, while veterans are those politicians with two or more legislative races under their belts. For the former category, we create a secondary distinction in the form of local winners, who are amateurs in legislative elections but with winning experience at the municipal level. We expect significant differences between these two categories as well, as voters will see a previous local winner differently than a completely new amateur candidate in the legislative arena.

Furthermore, for the electoral performance dimension, we establish the cut point as the vote share of the first losing candidate for the same coalition in the previous legislative election. Thus, under-performing candidates are those with a lower vote share than the candidate closest to a seat – but unable to get one – in the previous election for the same coalition. This assumes that parties will take as an initial measure to evaluate the future of their unsuccessful candidates the comparison between their performance to the results of candidates selected in the past for the same district.

Results of the statistical analyses performed to our original database show that local winners are more likely to be re-nominated than amateur candidates with no experience, and electoral over-performers have a greater chance of coming back for the same seat in the next election. Additionally, our models show the determinants for other outcomes, like seeking a higher election in the future, changing districts within the same chamber, or retiring from electoral politics. We find that veteran candidates are more
likely to seek a higher election – thus moving from the Lower Chamber to the Senate, or from the Senate to the presidency.

In addition, compared to amateurs, electoral over-performers and local winners are less likely to retire from electoral politics. Moreover, candidates who ran in districts where the capital city is located are more likely to switch districts within the same chamber. This effect is also significant with over-performers from capital city districts, suggesting that parties pay special attention to candidates in more notorious districts, and over-performers are moved to better districts for future elections.

These results cover the first seven legislative elections celebrated after the return of democracy in Chile, between 1989 and 2013. The legislative election of 2021 will be the first one to show us the fate of many 2017 losing candidates, so future research includes the exploration of many of the losing candidates featured in this analysis. An important additional consideration relates to the current political turmoil in the region, and the possibility of former also-rans looking to reap benefits from an uncertain scenario is a very interesting wrinkle to explore.

Lastly, Chapter 4 explores the mechanism of presidential appointments as a system to reward good losers of legislative elections. The literature on the subject claims that the main cause of this “insurance policy” arrangement stemmed from the presence of the binomial electoral system, that implemented a district of magnitude of two across all bailiwicks, fostering both intra and inter-coalition competition. This made parties in the two most powerful coalitions present two strong pairs of candidates fighting in key districts for only two seats, which made two resourceful challengers lose out on a legislative seat.
As a consolation prize for incurring in these costs, and for potentially staining their records with an electoral defeat, the coalition that ended up winning the concurrent presidential election used appointments as a reward for top losers. In order to identify those good losers, we use two strategies. First, we replicate and extend the work done by Carey and Siavelis (2003) in their theorizing of electoral “bridesmaids” for the three legislative elections between 1989 and 1997. Their framework classifies those candidates as the losers in the pairings of the triumphant coalition in the presidential election.

Our extension develops two new models, one including the seven elections between 1989 and 2013, and one with the 2017 race, after the electoral system change. The first model shows that Senate candidates have a greater chance of being appointed than Lower Chamber also-rans. This result is consistent with the original authors’ findings. In turn, the between-coalition ratio – measuring the vote difference between the two most powerful Chilean coalitions by district – loses its significance, while the within-coalition ratio – marked by the vote difference between candidates of the same coalition – gains significance with more observations collected.

In turn, the coefficients for the 2017 model – with a new operationalization for a bridesmaid politician – show the expected direction but lack statistical significance for all three variables of interest. This is why we use our original database to assess the determinants of a presidential appointment after an electoral defeat, as the second part of our exploration. We used similar measures for the electoral experience of an also-ran, and we created an original measure for electoral performance. This indicator identifies the “first losers” for the coalition that made the appointments in the following
presidential administration. A first loser is a candidate who ended up the closest to a seat in a district but was not able to win it. A rare events logistic regression finds that first losers have a greater likelihood of being appointed than other types of losing candidates. We also find significant effects for Senate candidates, but no significant effects for the experience of an also-ran.

This project is a novel attempt at exploring the fate of legislative losing candidates across time. We now have evidence to claim that it matters how a candidate loses, and therefore not all losers should be placed in the same box as election residuals, nor we should expect losing candidates to behave like a monolithic group. Now, it becomes imperative to continue the work to expand the literature on the subject, but we hope this is the start of a comparative study of unsuccessful candidates.

The role of losers has been overshadowed by the short-term dynamics of winners. However, when knowing that politicians like Hillary Clinton, Newt Gingrich, Mitt Romney, and John Kerry all continue to be relevant in American politics despite experiencing different degrees of electoral defeat, it becomes clear that some also-rans have the potential to break away from that label and become electorally viable politicians with prosperous careers.
Chapter 1: A Theory of Losing Candidates

Conceptualizing Losers of Elections

Why do parties re-nominate electoral losers? Losing an election deals a significant blow to a politician’s hopes of developing a political career. Showing up to a popular race and not winning the seat in dispute can affect the future strategies of a candidate to a great degree. However, if we think about politicians who are relevant in the political arena, many of them suffered electoral defeat but were re-nominated by their parties despite this. One of the most notorious cases of a still-relevant losing candidate is Hillary Clinton, unsuccessful in the 2008 democratic presidential primaries and runner-up in the 2016 presidential election, who still holds strong political influence in American politics.

Similarly, before Newt Gingrich shaped the landscape of the American Congress as a perennial member of the House at the end of the 20th century, he was defeated at the ballot box. As a Republican newcomer, he ran for Georgia’s 6th congressional district against Democrat John J. Flynt, in 1974 and 1976, losing both times. However, Gingrich obtained over 48% of the vote in a district historically dominated by the Democratic Party. When Flynt retired from politics in 1978, Gingrich won the seat with over 54% of the votes, being reelected six more times. After the 1990 census, Gingrich kept control of a redrawn 6th district for six more years until his departure from the House in 1999 due to internal conflicts in the Republican Party.
Also-rans\textsuperscript{1} have an important role in politics as challengers who support the system that is governed by winners, and their consent to abide by these rules despite losing is key to maintain democratic systems (Anderson et al., 2005). However, we still lack a strong grasp on the strategies that both political parties and losing candidates develop once they are aware of their electoral defeat. Theories like the incumbency advantage (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002; Cox and Katz, 1996; Cox and Morgenstern, 1993; Trounstine, 2011) and the closeness of elections (Cox and Munger, 1989; Geys, 2006) have the goal of assessing the margins for candidates to win an election, while losers appear as afterthoughts who are relevant only when they give the favorites a hard time to secure the seat.

At the same time, political parties are very active in the post-election period when they decide the fate of their unsuccessful hopefuls, but a systematic analysis of these dynamics is lacking. Parties face a difficult predicament when deciding which candidates to re-nominate for the same seat in the next election, which candidates to move to other districts, and those also-rans who will not make the cut for future elections or are thought for other roles within government. Therefore, just as not all winners are the same, also-rans are not equal. As a contrast to the Gingrich example, we have 2016 presidential hopeful Jill Stein, who ran in multiple elections with no success but has remained a visible face for the Green Party.\textsuperscript{2} Meanwhile, Joe Crowley decided to step down from electoral politics after losing to newcomer Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.

\textsuperscript{1} For clarity purposes, when we talk about terms like also-rans, losing candidates, unsuccessful politicians and hopefuls throughout this dissertation, we are referring to the same thing: a candidate who lost an election and was unable to win a seat.

\textsuperscript{2} For more information, see https://ballotpedia.org/Jill_Stein
As the examples reviewed show, parties face uncertainty when making these decisions, having to anticipate the potential success of their candidates to the best of their abilities. As most actors in politics are risk-averse, most nomination strategies from parties follow candidates who are successful, whether inside their parties or in general elections (André et al., 2017; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Norris, 1997). Hence, when the scenario is unfavorable and suffers from low levels of information, instead of doing a hard reset and trying entirely new candidates, the best strategy for parties may be to follow potential signals of success from some of their politicians who just lost an election.

This chapter proposes a theory for losing candidates that builds from two moments that political parties observe, taking as signals of the relative strength of their candidates compared to others. One of those moments is known before the election and is related to the electoral experience of the candidate at the time of running, while the other moment is revealed after the unsuccessful election and centers on the degree of electoral performance of the hopeful. A combination of these two features generates different types of losing candidates, that have differing expectations and are seen differently by their parties.

Before candidates are selected, parties have a sense of the experience of their best exponents. In the selection process, most candidates are placed in seats all actors believe they can win. But when that does not happen, parties pay attention to the performance of the also-ran to make any future decisions. In some cases, giving a losing

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3 As we will touch upon later in this chapter, we also recognize that some candidates run for reasons other than winning.
candidate a second chance at the seat they could not secure the first time is the best strategy for a risk-averse political party. This is due to the experience or notoriety of the also-ran, or because the candidate performed better than anticipated despite losing, and one more try can get him over the required threshold to win a seat. Also, when faced with an amateur running instead, parties do have more information about this losing candidate than about a candidate with no experience in the same type of elections.

So, these *ex-ante* and *ex-post* signals create two different dimensions that help with information deficits, making parties more or less likely to re-nominate a losing candidate for an upcoming election. First, we expect that the electoral experience of a politician in the legislative arena will make significant differences in how a party sees them, compared to candidates lacking such experience. Keeping all else constant, a candidate with at least one previous appearance in the same election will have an advantage over an amateur candidate, because they will be perceived as having a greater know-how and to be better prepared to face the challenges of an election of this magnitude.

There is ample literature dealing with the concept of candidate quality (Carson et al., 2007; Jacobson, 1990; Krasno and Green, 1988; Mondak, 1995), showing among other things that previous experience can give candidates an edge in electoral politics. So, by itself, a candidate with a previous appearance in the same election will send a signal that she is better prepared than an amateur, and we expect that after an election where both of those candidates lost, the chances of re-nomination are greater for the more experienced also-ran.
Then, losing candidates who do well electorally and barely missed the cut have another bargaining chip to negotiate their fates as politicians, especially when compared to also-rans from the same party who did poorly, or well below expectations. Likewise, there is evidence regarding the placement of losing candidates, and “first losers” or runners-up are seen differently than an also-ran further down on the list of losers (Anagol and Fujiwara, 2016; Shepsle, 2003). These “rank heuristics” can serve as a first signal to voters and parties to consider one losing candidate more seriously than another, helping them be placed in a more friendly scenario in a future election.

To test this theory, we use data from legislative elections in Chile. This country has a multiparty system with two strong coalitions that resemble many features of the American two-party system. However, much more dynamism is observed at the party level and after third-coalitions form to compete with the two bigger historical groups in a given election. In both the intra-coalition and inter-coalition dynamics, parties are in relative positions vis-à-vis other parties, so an over-performer from one coalition can be in better standing than an over-performer from another, and a candidate switching from one party to another can improve her chances to win much more than if the change were to be to a third party or to an independent candidacy.

Moreover, Chile offers stability to measure the same variables over time, keeping most of the control variables constant over time for the legislative elections between 1989 and 2013, right before the institutional changes to the electoral system done in 2015. This stability diminishes the role of time-constrained variables and allows us to more cleanly trace the variation in the dependent variable to the effect of the
independent variables added in the models. Then, the 2017 legislative election under
the new electoral system is a good instance to perform comparisons between systems.

This is especially salient considering another feature that the former Chilean
electoral system for legislative elections was said to create. Given that districts were all
of magnitude two, with a D’Hondt arrangement of assigning seats after counting votes
by coalition instead that by candidate, there was the possibility of two candidates of the
same coalition getting both seats if they doubled the vote share of all other coalitions in
the district. This generated intense competition across districts, and the two strongest
cisions recruited top candidates for battleground bailiwicks.

However, the possibility that many of these resourceful candidates would lose
their bids was significant, so a “consolation prize” structure developed, where the ruling
calition – decided after the presidential election, most of the time concurrent with the
legislative race – would use presidential appointments as a way to reward good losers
with strong resumes who took considerable risks after running for a seat that was tough
to obtain (Carey and Siavelis, 2003; Navia, 2005).

This system also shows the marked importance that also-rans have for Chilean
politics. Losing candidates are not considered a residual of elections, and parties
recognize the value of many of them, and the hefty costs that they had to pay to appear
in some elections instead of choosing other positions. Thus, when a coalition wins the
executive power, their most successful also-rans are called back to positions of
presidential trust, like a cabinet position to serve within the country, or an ambassador
position to serve abroad.
Consequently, the first empirical chapter of this project is an analysis of the 1989-2013 election period, with the main goal of assessing the determinants of re-nomination for also-rans. This exploration is complemented by separate statistical analyses of three more outcomes occurring: a losing candidate seeking a higher seat in the next election, an also-ran changing districts within the same chamber, and an unsuccessful hopeful retiring from electoral politics. We expect that both experienced and high-performing losers will seek better opportunities within the legislative branch, while those candidates lacking experience or those suffering a poor showing will have a higher chance of retiring from electoral politics.

Meanwhile, chapter 4 in this project consists of an exploration of the “insurance policy” system for good losers of legislative elections. We compare the system before and after the electoral reform of 2015, tackling the claim that it was the incentives within the old system that helped create this arrangement. However, we expect that regardless of the system in place, candidates of discernible quality will decide to run in competitive elections because these races provide enough visibility to their parties and coalitions, who can later reward the best also-rans with future appointments.

The main findings of this project show that candidates who perform better than the first loser in the previous election for the same district are re-nominated in greater numbers than the rest of losing candidates. In turn, having held a seat in a lower election increases the chances of re-nomination for candidates, compared to amateurs with no experience. Additionally, the system of rewards from the executive for good legislative losers continues to be used under a new electoral system for legislative elections. These findings show that losers of elections are not to be considered an afterthought, and that
parties and administrations do keep an eye on promising candidates, despite electoral setbacks.

We hope that these two ways of looking at the relevance of losing candidates in a political system opens the door for more analyses of the role of also-rans in politics, not only as spoilers or as leftovers of elections. A comparative look at also-rans can unearth party dynamics that have remained understudied for too long, enlightening us on how actors see electoral defeat. For some, losing an election can be a first step to a shift in campaign efforts that lead to eventual victory. And for others, strong losers can still be valuable assets for a future presidential administration.

**It Matters How You Lose**

Regardless of the challenges facing also-rans, losing an election is not necessarily a death sentence for politicians. This is due to losers not being equal in their expectations when considering future elections, and parties not evaluating losers in the same way. In addition to Gingrich, we have witnessed a myriad of other cases of former losers being able to develop a political career despite a significant electoral setback. Mitt Romney is a current Senator for the state of Utah despite losing a Senate seat in 1994 and a presidential bid in 2012. Ralph Nader could not find success in presidential elections but has been instrumental for policy discussions and policy change. And more recently, Robert Francis “Beto” O’Rourke gained national notoriety after losing the Texas 2018 senatorial election. But just as we see potential for success, there are
candidates who turn into perennial candidates and never achieve any electoral accomplishments.\footnote{For an extreme case of a perennial loser of elections, see the story of Canadian John Turmel: https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/ontario-election-2018/meet-john-turmel-canada-s-most-defeated-election-candidate-1.3877244}

The current literature dealing with electoral politics mentions also-rans mostly in the context of them being an obstacle to the eventual winners (Herron and Lewis, 2007; Horng-En Wang and Chen, 2019; Jenkins and Morris, 2006), and centering on issues like the competitiveness of elections, the incumbency advantage and voter turnout. But a systematic analysis of the fate of also-rans that goes further than a surface-level examination is lacking. Despite being introduced and advanced by a set of authors some decades ago (Riker, 1986), it seems that the last couple of decades have provided a larger window for the study of also-rans (Anagol and Fujiwara, 2016; Anderson et al., 2005; Shepsle, 2003).

For example, exploring a promising avenue of research regarding the paths of legislative politicians that goes beyond winning the next election, Coates and Munger (1994) include more outcomes for these types of candidates that include defeat, retirement and pursuit of other office. Results of their study show that vote share is a strong \textit{ex-ante} determinant of losing an election in the future and the incumbency advantage is greater for freshman politicians. These results show that the interpretation of theories that involve the security and prospects of politicians is incomplete when only considering candidate success as winning, and candidate failure as losing.

Moreover, after elections draw winners and losers, voters, the media, and scholars tend to discount those who could not secure a seat, in favor of studying and
covering elected officials. This “survivorship bias” makes actors focus disproportionately on winners of elections, overlooking the rest of the candidates. By omitting the role of also-rans, studies and reports leave a significant part of the puzzle out of the analysis, overestimating the relevance of those who win elections, and treating losers as a monolithic group with no possibility of improvement and no prospects for the future.

This approach, however, is far from accurate. Looking at the number of challengers in a race can help us understand why some incumbents retire while others changed districts after losing. Similarly, looking at the vote share of also-rans can tell us why some of those losing candidates came back for the next election while others did not. Then, some losing candidates today will be election winners, policymakers, or appointed authorities tomorrow. Depending on factors like their age, party, ambition or even the right opportunity, many former losing candidates will end up in a position of power in politics.

Thus, it becomes important to know how they were able to get there knowing the dynamics of the evolution of candidates who once were also-rans is an important challenge for political science. In this project, we advance that both the electoral experience and performance of a candidate are key signals for parties to re-nominate some of them for the same seat in the next election. However, there are different combinations of these two dimensions that will yield different outcomes for losing candidates. Winning an election is only a part of the equation for the success or failure of a political career, and we need to uncover more of the mechanisms that place candidates in the ballot on Election Day.
For example, also-rans who surpassed the expected vote shares for the party the first time running can be asked to come back and run for a second time. Also, when hopefuls are nominated to run against a powerful incumbent, that race can be considered a trial run for the candidate, so losing may be an expected outcome in the present, but one that could open partisan doors for the candidate in the future. After analyzing the potentially different fates of different also-rans over time, we develop a typology of losing candidates that follows partisan considerations before and after elections occur. This typology helps explain why some of these unsuccessful challengers return to politics for more elections, while others do not run again.

Additionally, this dissertation tackles the notion that quality candidates must be electorally successful, as we present evidence that shows that even quality hopefuls have lost elections over time. In fact, losing an election can give some candidates an edge over inexperienced candidates in a future election, so some of these also-rans have ample reasons to come back and fight for a seat one more time. Parties can influence the future of politicians too, as some systems with strong parties may develop “insurance mechanisms” for candidates who are assured defeat, enticing them with favorable appointments if they run and lose in tough districts. Similarly, other also-rans who lost the support of their respective parties may come back as members of other parties, or even as independents.

In our case, leaving also-rans outside of the understanding of the fate of winners and representative politics paints an incomplete picture of the entire phenomenon. This omission can affect our view of electoral politics, especially when former also-rans with a similar set of features than previous winners were able to secure a seat and losing an
election at one point in time actually helped the politicians in their political career. It is
the work of both winners and losers that moves the system forward, and it is through
the way actors adapt to their outcomes that we see how future elections shape. When
we see the work done by both politicians and political parties to be part of this dynamic,
we are better equipped to understand the role and contribution of electoral politics in
established democracies.

After elections are over, losers are dealt a significant blow in their potential for
a successful political career. After all, their campaigns failed to meet expectations. But
many of them do not go home after defeat and continue to think in popularly elected
office as their next career move. Failed races show also-rans what went wrong with their
campaigns, granting them an experience they could use in a future attempt at running
for office. Despite this, current literature seems to focus solely on what happens in the
spotlight, dismissing the other side of the same coin (Anderson et al., 2005: 2) and the
work that also-rans and parties perform after elections are over.

This more nuanced framework on the fate of losing candidates seems especially
relevant in a single-member, plurality system, like the one used in higher offices in the
United States, and in many other countries in the world. All candidates placed second
or below in these elections are immediately losing candidates, despite having different
degrees of experience, resources, and personal features. And this happens whether a
candidate loses by thousands of votes or if he loses by one single vote. Failing to capture
these differences between losing candidates is an important topic to explore for
comparative electoral politics.
For all these reasons, a study of also-rans should consider the strengths of candidate before and after elections. Looking at the experience and performance of candidates creates distinct also-rans that have varying expectations and strengths. In the next section we propose a typology of losing candidates from the point of view of parties, after a race is over, and considering the electoral experience of candidates before they failed to win a seat, and their electoral performance after the election.

Looking for Stand-Out Defeats

When looking at the pool of candidates in an election, experts gauge – with varying degrees of success – who will win a given seat. This is partly based on several candidate features, ranging from their previous experience in politics, their ability to raise funds, their political party, if they held that same office before, or if they are resourceful challengers, to name a few. One dimension that has garnered a significant amount of research is the quality of the candidates. Several measures have been developed to measure candidate quality, and we will review some of them below.

The quality of a candidate is a combination of measurable traits that allow us to distinguish across candidates. Some of those traits give the candidates more “quality” over others and could make a difference when running for a seat (Carson et al., 2007). Generally, a measure of the quality of a candidate may include personal characteristics like their charisma and perceived strength as a candidate, the ability to develop a successful campaign (Squire, 1992), the capacity to be easily recognized by voters (Kam and Zechmeister, 2013), as well as their previous electoral experience and on-the-job competence (Mondak, 1995) and their ability to raise funds (Jacobson, 1990).
As an illustration of the importance of candidate quality, we can think of two candidates who share the same features, except for one of them being a previous representative and the other not having previous political experience. Keeping all else constant, the candidate that has political experience can be understood to be of higher quality than the other, because it is assumed this time in office provided the politician with a degree of know-how as to how to perform in the job. Compared to the higher quality candidate, the challenger does not possess that trait, and thus can be perceived as less optimal for the job by both parties and the electorate.

The value of a measure like candidate quality is that these features send a signal to voters that one politician is of higher quality than another. For example, previously holding office can provide an electoral cushion for a candidate (Krasno and Green, 1988), so challengers without previous experience might decide against running when another hopeful with a race under her belt seeks the incumbent’s seat. Thus, seeing an experienced hopeful in the ballot works as a heuristic for voters with regards to her quality, and to the potential to do a good job – or continue to do that job – once elected (Jacobson, 1989). After all, “we want representatives whom we can trust, and we want representatives who can get the job done” (Mondak, 1995: 1045).

Another sign of the quality of a candidate is their ability to raise money. Established politicians have less problems raising substantial sums of money for their campaigns, due to the notoriety and the networking advantages that holding office gives incumbents. Challengers have noticed this institutional advantage from sitting legislators (Miller, 2014: 83) that at times precludes prospective candidates from even running against resourceful incumbents. To tackle this disparity and level the
campaigning playing field, some have advanced the possibility of enhancing public funding for candidates and setting up caps for established politicians’ ability to fundraise (Miller, 2014), though some have found no major impact of policies like this (Brogan and Mendilow, 2012).

Starting with an indicator of previously holding office, measures of candidate quality have refined over time, including dummy variables that now gauge celebrity status, the visibility of the challenger, among others that give a more nuanced look at professional and amateur candidates (Canon, 1990). As a complement of this type of quality, which can be defined as a set of strategic skills (Stone et al., 2006), a set of personal skills are also needed to achieve a certain degree of quality that could make a difference come Election Day. These two features seem to work in tandem, because an attractive personality without the skills to campaign adequately will find it hard to win elections, while good campaigners with no charisma will also struggle to win a seat.

Personal traits can be the deciding factor in winning or losing an election, or in losing by a big margin or losing it by a few percentage points. One example of a candidate who exploited his attractive set of personal traits – which was complemented with strategic skills and political experience – is the aforementioned Beto O’Rourke. As a Texas senatorial candidate in the 2018 midterm elections, O’Rourke challenged incumbent Ted Cruz, campaigning on a platform of social media exposure and reaching out to college campuses and the more urban demographics in the state for their votes.

Despite losing, O’Rourke mobilized a significant part of the younger, college-educated population, and was able to obtain 48.3% of the votes, losing by a bit over 200 thousand votes, from a total of over 8 million votes cast. Recently, O’Rourke dropped
out of the 2020 presidential race after chasing the Democratic Party nomination for several months.

Another example of a losing candidate who may have benefitted from the platform they were in is Stacey Abrams, the gubernatorial also-ran for the state of Georgia in the 2018 midterm elections. Losing by a narrow margin, amidst some claims of voter suppression and fraud, Abrams was able to obtain almost 49% of the vote in that race, bettering the vote share of previous challengers.5 Before running for this seat, she served in the Georgia legislature, and this electoral defeat classifies her as an established politician. Currently, Abrams is said to be evaluating her political future, but after drawing record numbers of minority voters to the polls, while also winning a higher share of White voters than Barack Obama in the state,6 she could be in good position to be nominated by the Democratic Party in a future prominent election.

In most cases, candidates who strive for office have their sights set on winning a seat, and expectations would focus on what to do after they win. However, constrains generated by the context of the election make some candidates have different motivations to run, that extend beyond winning. Thus, despite having a general expectation to win, some candidates know that winning will not be the outcome of the election, and yet they still decide to run. This can be explained by, for example, the motivation to be vote-seeking or policy-seeking politicians (Strom, 1990), following their personal convictions, or the behavior of the party they represent.

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5 For more on Abrams’ electoral history, see https://ballotpedia.org/Stacey_Abrams
This contrasts with a third model of behavior, *office-seeking*, which centers on candidates and parties trying to maximize their chances of obtaining office benefits with the limited options they have (Müller and Strøm, 1999). If candidates are more interested in the other two ways of public service, it is likely that they will conceptualize electoral defeat differently than contenders who are mainly office-seekers. On the one hand, vote-seekers may be satisfied with taking votes from other challengers and building an electoral base for a future election, or a future candidate. And on the other hand, policy-seeking politicians may be running to publicize their policy platform and to try to mobilize a dormant section of the electorate for a future run at office, or for future candidates with similar proposals.

The distinction is made between candidates who have little to no chance of winning and those with potential to win the seat. Despite the expectation of doing the best possible to win, some elections feature non-serious potential candidates (Carsey and Berry, 2014), who are not expected to win, but can build from good showings to develop a potential political career. Vote shares can be a good indicator of future success, and “[a]lthough previous vote share is partly an evaluation of the party and partly an evaluation of the candidate on the ballot, it is the best overall indicator of the party’s prospects for success in the next election” (Carsey and Berry, 2014: 255).

This section focused on the shortcuts that voters and parties can use to distinguish between candidates when trying to assess their potential to be successful, sometimes despite an electoral setback. In the end, given that politicians are not equal, it is also expected that losing candidates are not all the same, as there is a myriad of dimensions that determine candidates’ chances to further their political careers. In this
sense, adding an electoral defeat to the equation is another layer that politicians and parties need to evaluate before making their next move. When all these things work in combination, we will be able to answer why some losers come back to politics despite the strong deterrent of previous electoral defeat.

**The Electoral Performance and Electoral Experience of Also-Rans**

This project advances a theory for losing candidates and political parties that involves a calculation from the latter of the electoral performance and the experience of the former to evaluate their chances of re-nomination or other forms of return to the electoral politics fray in a future election. If this calculation does not yield a positive result, parties may consider to not present the same candidate for another run, and the candidate is then forced to switch parties, districts, or retire from electoral politics altogether.

Consider two candidates, A and B. They have similar backgrounds and similar expectations to win the seat they are chasing. Despite this, both lost their election, somewhat surprisingly. In the next election, candidate A secured a re-nomination while candidate B retired from politics. Despite both politicians having comparable experiences, one came back for another run while the other did not. We can think that two indicators may help us determine the likelihood of them coming back for another election. One of them is having a couple of elections under their belts, and the other is the electoral performance in the election, compared to previous candidates of the same party or coalition. If politician A ran in a couple of elections in the past and performed better than previous candidates of her same party, that can help explain her re-
nomination. And also-ran B’s under-performing in the election can explain his retirement from politics to a great degree.

Given that parties lack information and cannot evaluate losers’ performance in office, a proxy for this know-how is the experience of a candidate in the electoral arena. At the very least, having multiple races shows motivation and a drive to continue the pursuit for a seat despite adversity. It is advanced that the more experience an also-ran has, the more likelihood of a re-nomination, although this relationship is not expected to be linear. A second marker for the fate of losing candidates is their electoral performance, which matters more for inexperienced candidates. This is because inexperienced politicians can be thought of as lacking the know-how that seasoned candidates have, and a good performance can be the only factor that differentiates them.

Absent clearer indicators,\(^7\) having participated in an election in the past serves as an early marker for the quality of a candidate. Candidates with a greater degree of quality are positioned in a different part of the re-nomination spectrum than hopefuls with a lower degree of quality. When coupling this with the performance of the candidates, we have two dimensions working simultaneously to explain the chances of re-nomination for also-rans. Thus, the one ex-ante and the one ex-post considerations serve as signals, and we will observe differences between candidates with a certain level of experience and performance then from candidates with other values in those categories.

\(^7\) For example, Astudillo (2014) finds that in the Spanish case, being a party chairman increases the chances for re-nomination at the local level. Thus, in some situations we can follow clear signals that provide candidates with a greater degree of quality than other challengers.
Generally, we can expect that amateurs who under-achieve electorally will be less likely to be re-nominated for the same seat in the next election. And *ceteris paribus*, veterans should be called back more. For this study, politicians with less than two elections of experience in the legislative race are classified as *amateurs*, and candidates with more are considered *veterans*. The literature distinguishes these candidates in terms of quality, with politicians who have previous experience in politics considered to be of higher quality than candidates who are new to the electoral fray. Then, the *ex-post* consideration gives parties more information about their candidates. If a candidate over-achieves — understood here as obtaining a higher vote share than the first loser in the previous election for the same district — she is considered in higher regard than a candidate who under-achieved.

Today, Newt Gingrich is a widely-known figure that shaped the American legislature in significant ways. However, he started his career losing two U.S. House elections in a row, in 1974 and 1976. A closer look shows that despite failing to win the Georgia 6th congressional district, he came close in both elections and eventually won the seat once the incumbent retired. In his first couple of races, then, he was the amateur who accrued electoral experience while over-performing electorally. Even though he did not have a Republican predecessor — given that John J. Flynt ran unopposed in the previous two elections — Gingrich obtained over 48% of the vote in his first try, in a very strong Democratic district. After securing the seat in 1978, Gingrich became the first Republican ever to win that district, keeping the seat until his resignation in 1999.

Remaining inside the realm of American politics, we can revisit the example of Joe Crowley, former Democratic Congressman for New York’s 14th congressional
district. He served in that newly re-drawn district since winning the 2012 election, and before that he held the seat in the 7th congressional district since 1999.\(^8\) However, in the 2018 Democratic primary election, he was defeated by Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who obtained almost 57% of the primary vote – close to 17 thousand votes – compared to Crowley’s 43.3\(^{\circ}\).\(^9\) Crowley was the Chair of the House Democratic Caucus and held in high regard, but he was upset by Ocasio-Cortez. After this election, it has been reported that Crowley retired from electoral politics and is now a lobbyist.\(^{10}\)

Stepping outside of American politics, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas is a former candidate to the presidency of Mexico for the National Democratic Front (FDN) coalition. He ran in the 1988 election, in what was confirmed later by former president Miguel de la Madrid to have been a fixed contest to keep the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in power.\(^{11}\) After coming in second in this election, he remained in politics, running in the 1994 and 2000 presidential elections, ending up in third place both times (Roux, 2012). Despite Cárdenas’ ability to remain relevant in national politics with his veteran status, he could never secure the seat he pursued for most of his political career.

A similar case with a better outcome is observed in Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, former Brazilian president between 2003 and 2011. He helped form the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) in 1980 and quickly raised through the ranks to become the candidate for the state government of São Paulo in 1982. He lost that race, but defeat seemed to have helped him, as less than four years later he ran for the Chamber of

\(^{8}\) More information about his electoral history available in https://ballotpedia.org/Joseph_Crowley

\(^{9}\) https://ballotpedia.org/New_York%27s_14th_Congressional_District_election_2018

\(^{10}\) https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/19/crowley-shuster-lobbyists-1173771

Deputies, winning with a nationwide majority. This platform allowed him to become the presidential candidate for the PT in the newly implemented direct presidential elections.

However, it took Lula and the PT four tries to win the presidential seat (de Souza, 2011). After losing in the second round of the 1989 election and finishing second in 1994 and 1998, he won the presidential seat with 61.3% of the votes in the second round of the 2002 elections, defeating José Serra. Thus, Lula evolved from being a hopeful amateur to a prospect in little time, and losing elections helped him develop experience and gain quality until he was able to win in 2002.

All in all, what the examples show is that the two dimensions advanced in this chapter provide a fair amount of nuance to consider their fate after electoral defeat. Hence, a veteran under-performer in a presidential election can still be successful in a lower election at a different time. To illustrate this point, we can use the example of John Kerry. He served as U.S. Senator from Massachusetts between 1985 and 2013, and in 2004 he was the Democratic Party nominee for the November presidential election. Despite losing this election and performing slightly worse than the previous two Democratic Party candidates, Kerry returned to his Senate seat and was able to win reelection in 2008 with almost two-thirds (65.9%) of the vote.

This shows that politicians within the spectrum in each of the dimensions at one point in time and in one given election can still retain valuable qualities to be competitive at other points in time and different elections. This is certainly the case with Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who was elected as Head of Government of Mexico City in 1997 despite his previous presidential woes. Thus, parties can perceive the same candidate
differently in two different times and depending on the election they contest. This implies that parties have dynamic expectations, updating or modifying their perceptions of candidates as time goes by due to the dimensions highlighted in this chapter.

Another example of these dynamic expectations is reflected in the case of Mitt Romney. The 2012 presidential election was not the first time Romney experienced electoral defeat, as he lost the 1994 Senate election in Massachusetts against incumbent Ted Kennedy. At that time, Romney was an amateur who over-achieved electorally, obtaining 41% of the vote compared to 34% for the 1988 Democratic Party candidate, Joseph D. Malone, and the 38.3% obtained by Ray Shamie in 1982. Therefore, 1994 Mitt Romney is not the same politician as 2012 Mitt Romney. The former was an amateur who acquired experience and ended up winning a high-level office – when he served as Governor of Massachusetts between 2003 and 2007 – while the latter is perceived as an established veteran politician, who after defeat in a presidential election and some work in the private sector, went on to win a U.S. Senate seat for the state of Utah in 2018.

Lastly, some politicians can lose elections constantly and run for different seats over time, becoming perennial candidates. A rather extreme example of this is Vermont politician Cris Ericson. She ran as an independent candidate in two separate 2018 contests, for governor of Vermont and the U.S. House at-large district for the state. She obtained less than 1% of the votes in the first election, and over 3% in the second. Ericson also ran for Vermont governor – elected every two years – in every election

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12 After his own defeat, Malone was elected Treasurer and Receiver-General for Massachusetts in 1990, serving two four-year terms. In 1998, he lost a Republican primary to incumbent Governor Paul Cellucci, Mitt Romney’s predecessor.
between 2002 and 2014, failing to obtain more than 2% in all of these races. Additionally, she has ran for a senatorial or U.S. House seat every two years between 2004 and 2016, either as an independent or as a member of the United States Marijuana Party, with little success.\textsuperscript{13}

By looking at the varying paths that electorally unsuccessful candidates take, despite all undergoing the same treatment at one point in time, we can better appreciate the nuances regarding the topic of also-rans in electoral politics. The current research picture seems incomplete due to a lack of exploration of the expectations that both candidates and political parties have both before and after an election happens. It can be argued that both actors have a set of expectations – sometimes similar, sometimes not as much – as to how well they will do in an election, developing strategies in case they lose their race. If those expectations are surpassed, strategies and goals can change, and candidates can gain a better standing within the party, allowing for the opportunity to nurture a political career. Conversely, if expectations are not met, things can change for the worse.

\textbf{Losing Candidates and Political Parties}

Regarding candidate nomination and prospects for candidates after elections are finished, political parties have a pivotal role. Generally, parties have most of the leverage when it comes to the decision to re-nominate candidates. However, mediating factors like electoral over-performance or the retirement of a powerful incumbent can help candidates obtain a re-nomination in a contested district. Additionally, the history

\textsuperscript{13} More on Ericson’s electoral history is available at https://ballotpedia.org/Cris_Ericson
of the candidates can become a factor in their prospects. For example, there is evidence of a greater electoral success at the legislative level for candidates holding local election in the past (Put and Maddens, 2014), and for better fundraising abilities for politicians who held a seat in a state legislature (Berkman and Eisenstein, 1999).

Similarly, in close districts, parties can stand to win if they take a second look at their also-rans instead of banking it all on a new candidate without an electoral defeat in their resume. If the losing candidate improved the usual party showing in the district and another shot could help them jump the hurdle, the choice in favor of an also-ran with history in the district appears easier to make (Ackerman, 1957). Moreover, differences can be observed in the chamber that candidates are running, given inherent differences in notoriety and recognition. Thus, a senatorial also-ran could try her luck again in the same race and pull off an upset a second time around because the differences in recognition between challengers and incumbents are small (Hinckley, 1980).

Political parties are pivotal in this process, betting on formerly unsuccessful politicians in some districts while working out different scenarios with also-rans who do not seem fit for another electoral race. However, parties behave differently, and while some have a greater leeway to nominate candidates, others may choose to capitulate to the popularity of some of their hopefuls for electoral gains (Jacobson, 2017) or to some district characteristics that allowed for challenger emergence, like their vote on a previous election or the historical advantage of the party in the bailiwick (Hogan, 2004).

Parties face trade-offs when looking for new challengers, risking losing quality candidates in search of better prospects. Where parties are weak, they “lack mechanisms to enforce discipline and constrain politicians’ actions. In turn, this gives politicians
incentives to shirk, particularly when reelection is not an option and it is easy to continue a political career with a different party” (Klašnja and Titiunik, 2017: 145). Conversely, when parties are strong, they can deploy a lineup of strong candidates and develop a strategy of consolation prizes to appease losing candidates with a desirable appointment (Carey and Siavelis, 2003).

Then, bringing politicians from other parties can signify a turn towards success. In the cases of Ronald Reagan and Michael Bloomberg, their changes of party paid off. The former secured the Governorship of California and eventually the presidency in 1974, while Bloomberg won the New York City mayoral seat for three terms after switching from the Democratic to the Republican Party. Arguably, political parties have their own strategies in given elections, and it becomes important to determine what parties will nominate different types of candidates, and to what extent can losing candidates seek nominations from parties to maximize their chances of winning a seat. The party change from Michael Bloomberg, despite not happening because of an electoral loss, helped him win a seat and advance his political career. A longtime Democratic Party supporter, he switched to the Republican party to run in the 2001 mayoral election.14 Bloomberg is perhaps an exception in the sense that the party sought him as a candidate rather than the other way around. After this switch, Bloomberg was re-elected two more times, and left the Republican Party in 2007, though he ran as their member in the 2009 election.15 He ended up being the mayor of New York City between 2001 and 2013. After his stint, he eventually re-joined the Democratic Party, and

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15 https://ballotpedia.org/Michael_Bloomberg
endorsed Hillary Clinton for the 2016 presidential election. He is reportedly weighing a 2020 presidential run as part of the Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{16}

Further, the mechanisms within political parties can be stronger in some countries, and weaker in others. This can affect the rate in which politicians switch allegiances, because weaker parties can be perceived as vehicles to promote the political careers of ambitious politicians more than a platform that candidates align with to pass policies over time. In his 2006 article, Desposato offers a model of party switching, and in the case of Brazil, he finds that parties are “for rent”, serving to advance personal careers in detriment of institutional advancement (Desposato, 2006: 77). This arrangement leaves parties as instruments for the short-term electoral success of politicians, becoming easier for also-rans to look for new pastures to resurrect their chances to win a future election, sometimes despite a bad electoral showing.

Generally, party switching is a strategy that follows a calculus of candidacy and party affiliation, following a rational utility maximization decision (Aldrich and Bianco, 1992: 115). Thus, if parties have less stringent requisites for candidates, it makes sense for an also-ran who sees better prospects outside of the party to look for another place to launch their re-nomination attempts. In particular, and according to Schlesinger (1994), the United States has developed a party system that takes political ambition and channels it, allowing individual politicians to put forth as much effort to realize their own ambitions, but also to restrain themselves if the issue has the potential to erode the political system (Schlesinger, 1994: 37).

An example of a candidate who switched parties after losing a primary election and was able to win the general race was Congressman and former mayor of New York, the late John Lindsay. After being re-elected three times for the 17th Congressional District seat of the state of New York in the 1950s, Lindsay resigned shortly thereafter to run for mayor of New York City as a Republican, the same party he represented in the House. He won that election, but when starting his path towards re-election, he was defeated in the Republican primary. Despite this, he remained in the ballot as the candidate for the New York Liberal Party, and eventually won the 1969 election, defeating the candidate who beat him in the primary (Cannato, 2001).

A second consideration that affects losing candidates is their relationship with the party that nominates them. If parties re-nominate candidates, it is important to note in which part of the spectrum these also-rans are located, as it is arguably more likely that over-performers will be re-nominated for the same seat more than under-performers. Thus, parties have a rational decision to make when thinking about an election, and they need to evaluate the “demand” for a candidate in a district, that can remain positive even after an electoral setback. Generally speaking, parties and coalitions should decide if to pursue office, votes, or policy (Budge and Laver, 1986; Strøm, 1990), and that decision helps separate candidates, giving more chances to those with the greater potential to achieve the party goals for that district and survive politically (Leoni et al., 2004).

In this sense, parties can be in the market for former losers who ran for other parties in the past, given the slight advantage in information when compared to amateurs with no previous experience in politics. Just as politicians have their own rational
decisions to make, and at times decide to run in races that seem hard to win, parties have their own motivations that seek to maximize their chances for success as well. In some cases, a greater degree of party switching within a system can be a sign of a dynamic system, and not of a crisis. In their 2011 article, McMenamin and Gwiazda focus on the high degree of party switching from candidates at the legislative level in Poland to show how vote-seeking candidates look to survive in electoral politics. In cases like these, changing allegiances is not a bug but rather a feature of the system, and one that candidates and parties are aware of when trying to maximize their chances of success.

Another practical limitation for candidates is that in the top hierarchies of power, there are less popularly elected seats than at the state or local levels. For example, the Texas legislature is formed of 31 senatorial seats and 150 House seats, while the number of seats for Texas in the U.S. legislature is 2 for the Senate, and 36 for the House. This creates another constraint for parties and candidates, and those who have lost an election have one more strategy to think about when looking to advance their political careers.

To exemplify this, we can think of a political party competing for two different seats in the same election. For seat X, the party is looking to nominate a strong challenger against a weak incumbent, while for seat Y, the party is faced with an open seat and they know this district favors them. For seat X, the party gambles on a veteran former representative for that district who lost the previous election, while seat Y sees an amateur also-ran who over-achieved in a past election. By nominating an established politician in one district and a dark horse in the other, the party maximized its chances of winning both seats.
These dynamics – both within and across systems – help us wonder in what circumstances a political party will nominate the different types of also-rans that our two dimensions help generate. Parties themselves have varying expectations and goals in every election, and they can decide towards one type of candidate in one election and another type in a different race. Relatedly, they can choose one type one given year and a different one at a different time. Finally, parties also develop their own strategies after comparing themselves to other parties in the same system.

In a similar way, other parties will have different strategies for similar districts. If a third party – which would have a bigger pool of also-rans, given their inability to become one of the two major parties – wants to compete for those seats, they ought to nominate their strongest also-rans. However, if their intention is to mobilize different groups of the population to try to influence a particular set of policies, and not necessarily to win office, parties can choose a losing candidate who appeals better to those groups with a more long-term strategy. These types of candidates have been called \textit{sacrificial lambs} (Canon, 1993), because they face bad odds of winning in tough districts, but their campaigns can still be put to good use.

With that said, the passage of time provides us with more nuance regarding candidates who were inexperienced amateurs in their first attempts at winning office. Also-rans who did not perform at the level they expected, or who ran knowing they would lose can benefit from time passing, and their modified strategies can eventually pay off. Therefore, we can think of under-performing amateur politicians who developed over time, updated their expectations and strategies, ran again with these modifications and eventually won a popularly elected seat.
Conclusions

Every election draws losing candidates, and despite the belief that winning is the only way to stay relevant in politics and influence policy, a significant number of also-rans can develop stable political careers and maintain a role in electoral politics despite losing elections. This chapter offered a novel theory on losing candidates, focusing on the electoral experience and performance of hopefuls affecting their chances of re-nomination for future elections. Different degrees of experience and performance help explain why losing candidates are not created equal, and we can expect them to have their own set of expectations and strategies looking forward to new elections.

Because of the extreme focus of the literature on winning candidates, the factors that help explain the varying paths from also-rans have been systematically under-explained by most of the literature on electoral politics. As noted, the main contention of this project is that not every losing candidate is the same, and a better comprehension of the ways also-rans can differ from each other is necessary to understand why the paths they follow over time can be so distinct.

The typology of losing candidates offered in this chapter consists of two moments, one before and one after the election, which serve as signals for political parties and candidates when considering future contests. The ex-ante moment is a consideration of the electoral experience of the candidate, with politicians who have participated in more than two elections classified as veterans, while candidates with less than that considered as amateurs. After elections are contested, parties have a second marker for candidates who performed better than previous losers. Different levels of experience and performance from also-rans help us understand the different outcomes.
they take after losing an election. And we can anticipate that a better electoral performance compared to previous losers in the same district will be re-nominated more.

This categorization helps politicians and political parties when thinking about future elections, and to distinguish their candidates in the also-ran pool. At the same time, parties may differ in their ways of dealing with candidates, at times preferring one type while in other times leaning for another type. This depends on the needs of the party for the district they are seeking to win. In other words, not every losing candidate is the same, and this shows the different paths followed by them.

For example, a resourceful candidate who was just dealt electoral defeat after her second election can be expected to try to win office one more time, given the alleged bump from one election to the next in terms of experience. If she can maintain her connections, she seems an even stronger candidate for a repeat election (Mack, 1998), and certainly a threat to other, less connected candidates who lack the quality boost of having a couple of elections under her belt. With that said, there is also evidence that repeat challengers are not more likely to defeat an incumbent than two first-time candidates in consecutive elections (Squire and Smith, 1984).

Conversely, a first-time candidate with few resources who also experienced electoral defeat might not seek a re-nomination if they were considered sacrificial lambs – or candidates with the only goal to lose an election – by the party to begin with. But the opposite can be true if they have enough leeway to acquire more experience in another election without a big expectation of winning a seat. There might come a time when a former sacrificial lamb acquires enough experience and performs better over time, to guarantee more resources and support from his party in a future election.
Further, in systems with strong parties in which they provide insurance to strong candidates with a high risk of losing, electoral defeat is of less importance than for an independent candidate with limited resources. For the former, losing is part of the bigger game that parties are playing to increase their representation within the political system, and is more a part of how the game is played than a meaningful consequence. If career-minded politicians can secure a job that provides good benefits, losing an election at one point in time can just be a means to a greater, more ambitious end.

Similarly, other career-seeking politicians can acquire experience in running for elections and not develop an expectation of winning, but only to propose policy changes. They might seek to run for office in the future just to moderate other candidates’ positions and prove that policy-seeking politics is also a legitimate way to play the game. All in all, losing an election can help galvanize features that were already salient for each of these types of candidates. In this sense, losing an election can help us identify who is an able candidate to come back for another shot at office, and who is not, and perhaps never meant to be in electoral politics.

The next chapter deals with the selection of the Chilean case as the country to explore in this project, focusing on two main reasons. First, the Chilean legislative electoral system featured the *binominal* arrangement from 1989 to 2013, with a magnitude of two seats across all districts. This, combined with two very strong coalitions fighting for virtually all seats, summoned two pairings of strong candidates to win two seats for the same coalition. However, because that was not an easy feat, two powerful and resourceful candidates turned out to be losers that could be recalled for more elections in the future. We will be testing this relationship later in chapter 3.
Second, election results of the concurrent presidential races have also revealed the coalition that controls the executive, and the new president has had at his disposal a series of appointments. After the first seven legislative elections between 1989 and 2013, this prerogative has been used to reward good losers that parties consider can be better suited for a position in the executive power. We will test the determinants of this system of insurance for good losers over the years, both under the binomial system and the new electoral system that debuted with the 2017 legislative races, in more detail in chapter 4.

To finalize, losing candidates are not simple residuals of the electoral process and are seen by parties and coalitions as important actors in politics. We seek to explore the reasons why parties give second chances to electorally unsuccessful candidates, and what are the factors that help make politicians attractive despite defeat. Thus, chapter 2 will also present the hypotheses for both empirical chapters, and the expectations we have regarding this overlooked pool of candidates in legislative elections.
Chapter 2: Case Selection and Chapter Outlines

Why Chile?

Throughout history, Chile has caught the attention of many social scientists. Across generations, it appears that the country makes itself heard by a significant political event. In the last half-century, it featured the first democratically-elected Marxist president,\(^\text{17}\) a repressive dictatorship led by a captivating yet divisive military boss, and a return to democracy which relied on the rules that the authoritarian figure wrote to keep himself in power (Garretón, 1991). Moreover, in November 2019, while finishing the writing of this dissertation, we witnessed a popular uprising due to dissatisfaction with a center-right government that appears out of touch, unable to deal with issues like wealth inequality and poverty in a satisfactory way.\(^\text{18,19}\)

Some of these issues can be traced to the beginning of this half-century period. Chile was one more in the long list of South American countries that underwent a military dictatorship in the 1970s. Despite having a similar fate at the time as many of the countries in the region, Chile also had exceptional circumstances that marked the breakdown of democracy. For example, Sigmund (2003) claims that a crisis of legitimacy eventually led to the military, a body thought of as “legalistic, constitutionalist, and professional” (p. 242) for decades, to become politically active and orchestrate the coup that ousted Socialist president Salvador Allende in September of 1973.

\(^{17}\) For a BBC profile of Allende, see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3089846.stm
\(^{18}\) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/03/world/americas/chile-protests.html
\(^{19}\) https://time.com/5718241/protests-chile-resume-economy/
Naturally, the causes for the democratic collapse also touch on the location of the region in the context of international politics. The deployment of the Operación Cóndor – a doctrine of continental security that sought to share intelligence across the South American military states to deal swiftly with political opponents, with tactics that included torture and assassination – is an overt sign of American involvement in the region (McSherry, 2005). Further, studies have suggested a heightened role of the United States in the toppling of left-wing governments in the region (Hitchens, 2001; Kornbluh, 2013), and more recent evidence suggests a significant role of the World Bank, with its loans providing some much-needed legitimacy for an authoritarian regime looking to improve its standing after egregious human right violations (Kedar, 2018).

During the authoritarian regime, Pinochet sought to build a framework to transition to a democratic system (Garretón, 1995: 148), overseeing the writing of a new constitution ultimately ratified in 1980. Ultimately, this document would serve the opposition with the key to the end of the authoritarian regime, and a way for the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia – the center-left coalition opposing Pinochet – to win the game playing by the rules set by the authoritarian ruler himself.

The document established the election of a future president for the period 1989-1997, subject to a popular plebiscite. If the name proposed by the Commanders-in-chief of the armed forces was accepted by voters, that person would assume the presidency immediately while a bicameral Congress was set to be elected a year later.20 In turn, if

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20 The first democratic Congress also included nine designated Senators (Senadores designados), a figure that was included in the 1980 constitution. Similarly, former presidents serving more than six continuous years were to be named lifelong Senators (Senadores vitalicios). While designated Senators were
this person was rejected, Pinochet would stay in power for one more year until
democratic elections for president and Congress were held (Garretón, 1988: 22-3). This
referendum was celebrated on October 5\(^{th}\), 1988, and Pinochet – who ended up being
proposed as the candidate to lead the country for eight more years – lost the election
somewhat unexpectedly.

This defeat meant that Pinochet could not extend his rule beyond 1990,\(^{21}\) having
to follow the process he himself helped draw a few years before. Thus, he ruled for a
year after his defeat, until concurrent presidential and legislative elections were held on
December 14\(^{th}\), 1989. The first president elected after the military regime was Christian
Democrat Patricio Aylwin, who obtained 55\% of the votes. Those elections also granted
us with the first 120 Deputies, the first 38 Senators, and a much larger number of also-
rans.

With these rules, and after Pinochet’s departure, Chile has arguably had one of
the most stable democracies in the world, keeping elections free and fair while working
on necessary improvements to its institutions to consolidate the transition to democracy
(Boeninger, 1997). Despite being unable to solve important economic inequality and
social mobility problems (Santos, 2005), Chile remains a model democracy to pundits
in South America.

An advantage of the Chilean system is the consistency of its institutions. Since
1989, Chile has held legislative elections uninterruptedly every four years. Chile’s

\(^{21}\) However, Pinochet managed to remain a political figure with significant institutional presence as
commander-in-chief of the armed forces from 1990 until 1998. For more on this, see Garretón, 1991.
legislative framework has two chambers, a lower house (*Cámara de Diputados*) and a Senate (*Senado*). Deputies and Senators serve for four and eight years, respectively, without term limits. For the first seven legislative contests (1989-2013), the number of bailiwick districts remained the same, with 60 districts electing two lower chamber members, and 19 districts electing two senators each, for a total of 38. This changed after the Constitutional reforms of 2015, after law number 20.840 was passed in May of that year\(^{22}\). This new law set a new number of districts (*Distritos*) to 28, electing a total of 155 representatives, and 15 senatorial districts (*Circunscripciones*) electing 50 senators. After further changes made in 2017, the new Ñuble region was created in the south of the country, so there will be 16 senatorial districts starting in the 2021 election.

Senate elections are staggered, meaning that every four years a section of the chamber celebrates elections, while the other section remains in place for the next four years. This was established in 1989, where the entire chamber was selected, but four years later almost half of the chamber was up for re-election, while the other half enjoyed the regular eight-year term. The senatorial regions that elected candidates in 2017 were the first, second, fourth, and fourteenth, selecting two senators each, as well as the sixth, ninth, and eleventh, which selected five senators each.

Most of the seats across local, legislative and presidential elections have been contested between the two most powerful coalitions, the center-left *Concertación* and the center-right *Alianza*. The former political group was formed by the parties that rallied against the Pinochet authoritarian regime, becoming a strong political force in the months before the 1988 plebiscite that would allow Pinochet to stay in power for

\(^{22}\) [https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1077039](https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1077039)
eight more years. Following a successful advertising campaign that focused less on the abuses of the military regime and more on the bright future that political turnover would have for Chile, the group known then as the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia* was able to make the “No” campaign triumph in the polls (Boas, 2015; González and Prem, 2018).

The original members of the *Concertación* in 1989 were led by the *Christian Democrats* (DC) and the *Partido por la Democracia* (PPD), along with the *Socialist Party* (PS), *Radical Party* (PR), the *Greens* (PLV), *Humanists* (PH), and other smaller parties united against Pinochet. These parties ran in separate lists for the 1989 legislative election, however, with the PS leading their own electoral pact that took some seats away from the *Concertación*. In later elections, the PS would return and be part of the same coalition that would lead Chilean politics for the first two decades after the return of democracy.

The coalition was able not only to unseat Pinochet, but also to effectively govern the country after voters placed their trust on them. Through a combination of market reforms – some of them a legacy of the neoliberal military regime – and ambitious social initiatives (Toro and Luna, 2010), the *Concertación* ruled the executive branch uninterruptedlly from 1990 until 2009. Then, Sebastián Piñera, a successful entrepreneur and a center-right politician who voted “No” in the 1988 plebiscite, was able to win the presidency running under the colors of the opposing coalition, the *Coalición por el Cambio* (*Coalition for Change*), more popularly known as the *Alianza*.

This political partnership stemmed from politicians who supported Pinochet’s regime and opposed the ideology of the *Concertación*. The *Alianza* was formed
originally by two parties, the National Renewal (RN) and the Independent Democratic Union (UDI). Piñera was a member of the former party, less aligned with the Pinochet days but still proponent of its economically liberal agenda, while looking to form a democratic center-right coalition (Valenzuela, 1995). The UDI is a closer follower to the Pinochet ideology, highlighted by its founder Jaime Guzmán, ultimately killed by the left-wing Manuel Rodríguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) in 1991. Guzmán led a group of right-wing thinkers that saw the UDI as a civilian successor to the dictatorship (Barros, 2002).

These two coalitions have helped fill the political space that the former “three-thirds” filled in the period before the military coup of 1973 (Montes et al., 2000; Valenzuela and Scully, 1997). The three forces represented by Communists and Socialists, Christian Democrats, and the center-right National Party that were mainstream in the two decades before the military uprising have been reproduced through the prism of a duopoly. Because of this, and partly because of the restrictive character of the binominal electoral system in the legislature, it was more feasible that more parties joined the Concertación than a third-force breaking with this duopoly.

Thus, for the 2009 legislative election, the Communist Party (PC) joined the coalition in an agreement that would allow PC candidates to appear in the ballot while historical coalition parties would abstain from running their candidates in those districts. In turn, the PC would support the Concertación candidate for the presidency, Eduardo Frei (Passarelli, 2011: 75-6). Until 2018, when the Concertación as we know it was disbanded, the PC continued to be a part of the center-left coalition. However, some DC members showed signs of discontent, and a handful of career politicians left the party
and formed the *Independents’ Regionalist Party* (PRI), that eventually joined the *Alianza* in the 2017 legislative election (Luna and Mardones, 2010).

Another dynamic that was observed in the Chilean case from 1989 to 2013 was the within-party negotiation at the time of the nomination of candidates, especially in the case of the *Concertación*. Because of the number of parties forming the center-left coalition, deciding on two candidates per district always led to negotiation issues. In some instances, parties had to withdraw from districts and risk losing their ties with the electorate, while leaving good candidates out of elections (Gamboa and Morales, 2016: 137). This problem was deepened further after the PC joined the coalition and won seats in the 2009 legislative election.

The continuous requirement for the coalition to appear competitive across all districts is driven partly by the additional need to mobilize people for the concurrent presidential elections. In the case where a coalition did not have control of the district, parties within the group still had a vested interest in keeping voters engaged with their national platforms and the candidates they were supporting in the presidential race. Except for the legislative elections of 1997 and 2001, all other races were concurrent with a presidential election.

All this contrasts with, for example, the American case. Here, powerful incumbents from one party can scare off all potential challengers from other parties, running unopposed – or against easy third-party opposition – for another term. Hence,

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23 Moreover, Gamboa and Morales (2016) claim that the increasing problems in negotiation for candidate nomination was a main factor leading to the change in the electoral system. They argue that these problems were more important than seeking a more proportional system, something that all parties said they were after for electoral reasons.
in some districts, the decision to run is left to the candidates, so self-selection becomes a very important consideration in the U.S. (Aldrich, 2011; Banks and Kiewiet, 1989; Kazee and Thornberry, 1990; Thomsen, 2014). In the end, the need to mobilize party voters for other elections appears irrelevant in presidential election years, while not being present in midterm election years.

As we can see, despite a strong dominance of a duopoly, the partisan dynamics of the Chilean political system are rich and varied, and they still have control on the nomination of their candidates. With that said, the sometimes-intense process of negotiation within coalitions for the selection of candidates can meddle with a cleaner analysis of party dynamics. And unfortunately, we do not have access to that process, yet we proceed with our analysis of also-rans with the party affiliations we observe in the ballot on the day of the election.

Hence, this project collected the information on every losing candidate in the Chilean legislative elections from 1989 until 2017, focusing on the fate of losing candidates after experiencing electoral defeat. The main question of this project is: what are the determinants of re-nomination for also-rans? We explore this by performing statistical analyses that center on capturing the factors that affect the likelihood of a losing candidate repeating in the same seat. Additionally, we explore the determinants of other outcomes that also-rans go through, like seeking a higher election, changing districts and retiring.

A couple of limitations stand out in our data collection procedure. Because many also-rans have at most a couple of appearances in the legislative arena before they disappear from electoral politics, it is harder to keep a systematic record for some of
them. This divide is even greater in smaller districts with local candidates. So, we lack some information that in other contexts is easier to collect, like the candidates’ age, their careers before seeking a legislative seat, or a summary of their campaign expenditures. In fact, a significant portion of our variables were created out of more basic indicators like vote share or repeated appearances over time.

Yet, we contend that at this stage of the project, this apparent restriction can become a strength. Given that our main goal is to develop a theory of losing candidates that extends beyond the limits of our case study and eventually advances a comparative framework for the study of also-rans across countries, the set of variables we have collected is sufficient to start us in that path. We expect that looking into the fate of losing candidates across more contexts through this framework will be very fruitful, and future iterations of this study can include more sophisticated indicators.

Generally, results of our analyses show that veterans are regarded differently than amateurs, with the same for electoral over-performers compared to candidates who perform worse than expected. Thus, experienced politicians have less chances of being re-nominated and more chances of changing districts, while over-achievers have more chances of being re-nominated and less chances of retiring from electoral politics. Because we can plausibly expect a compound effect for experienced candidates who also over-performed in their elections in their different strategies moving forward, we captured the combination between these two markers, adding interaction terms in a handful of models featured in the appendix section.

However, support for these indicators is mixed. Despite the direction of the coefficients being in line with the expected effects drawn for our hypotheses regarding
experience and performance separately, the interaction terms lack statistical significance across all models where they are included. This may be telling us that parties consider these dimensions separately. For example, parties are perhaps overlooking the lack of experience from a candidate if her performance was stellar. This implies that the a priori conditions given by these dimensions are not necessarily observed in practice, making the fate of losing candidates a more complex issue than expected.

The Fate of Losing Candidates in Legislative Elections

Developing a systematic theory of also-rans that builds on the previous discussion about candidate quality, partisan support and electoral performance can help us understand the paths these also-rans take after experiencing electoral defeat. This work seeks to improve the incomplete notion that because losers receive the same treatment, they are seen as a homogeneous group of “non-winners”. Yet, candidates do not come from identical backgrounds, do not possess the same tools and traits, and elections do not occur in equal circumstances. This implies that losers will not handle defeat in the same way, that parties will evaluate each defeat differently, and some of these unsuccessful candidates will be back in politics sooner or later.

This section presents four claims that are related to four of the outcomes that occur to also-rans after experiencing electoral defeat. Overall, we assume a scenario of low information across all legislative elections and a risk-aversion from political parties when it comes to their strategies of re-nomination. We can expect that absent all information, parties will select a new set of challengers to contest future elections after
concluding that the original set of losing candidates is not better than this new set of candidates.

However, this assumption appears to be too strong because parties do count with a handful of informational cues to determine the strength of their own candidates, including those who lost an election. First, parties know about the electoral experience of their candidates, and they can expect a greater degree of quality and know-how from veteran politicians (Jacobson, 1990; Mondak, 1995) than from their more inexperienced candidates. Thus, an initial consideration from parties is that quality candidates should be regarded better than amateur hopefuls due to what they bring to the table.

Then, a second dimension of analysis is related to the electoral performance of candidates. This dimension is relevant across all stages of a candidate’s electoral experience, but it has a larger weight for amateur candidates. In other words, lacking other informational cues, electoral over-performers will be regarded better than candidates who performed as expected or those hopefuls who under-performed. When counting on these two cues, parties have more information about this set of candidates, and they will tend to choose the ones who stand out in these two dimensions for one more run for the same seat. As risk-averse actors, parties deciding for this strategy is less risky than selecting new candidates for every seat in dispute in the next election.

As noted, different values across these two dimensions allow for the existence of different types of also-rans. With this, we can expect a few different clusters of losing candidates who, after following their experience and performance, will tend to choose a path for their futures that is allowed by their parties. First, given that the most powerful signal for parties is the one of electoral performance, parties will decide quickly on this
front, and try to keep their successful candidates pursuing the same seat in which they over-performed. Thus, leaving aside the electoral experience of candidates, and keeping all else constant, we can claim that parties will seek to re-nominate their successful candidates for the same seat one more time.

\textit{H1: Losing candidates who electorally overperformed in their district are more likely to be re-nominated for the same seat in the next election, regardless of their electoral experience.}

Next, we argue that the electoral experience of an also-ran can make a difference in the nomination strategies of a party. Conventional wisdom suggests that parties will fill their lists with winners, but at times nominating an experienced loser can be a better option in some districts. For example, in the case of seeking a higher election seat, candidates and parties know that appealing to a larger electorate requires better-known challengers. Since electoral performance is believed to be a good marker for the achievement of a candidate within a district, experience can be a better indicator of the quality of a politician across districts.

Therefore, we expect more experienced candidates to evaluate future moves that go beyond staying in their own districts, and to consider seeking a higher election seat in more numbers than other types of candidates.\textsuperscript{24} This is irrespective of the performance of the candidate, due to parties considering experience as a more exportable trait than performance. From this, we have our second claim:

\textsuperscript{24} Regarding higher seats, we refer to changes for candidates from one election to the next in the following way: if a House candidate moves to the Senate or the presidency for their next election, or if the change is from the Senate to the presidency, these are jumps to a higher office.
**H2: Veteran also-rans are more likely to seek a higher election seat than amateur losers, regardless of electoral performance.**

Third, we build from the structure of the discussion about the re-nomination of also-rans to branch out for the explanation of a novel scenario. Along with parties evaluating presenting the same candidates for the same seats, there are special circumstances where some also-rans performed well enough to qualify for better seats within the same chamber. Arguably, parties will try to keep most of their successful also-rans in the same seat, expecting that one more election will make them winners. But parties also make the decision to switch the districts of candidates in future elections.

This decision can be tied to the notoriety of the candidates as well as the districts in dispute in a race. Particularly, the region where the Chilean capital is located serves as a battleground where parties are always experimenting to find candidates with the greatest potential to build political capital. Due to the strong emphasis on the central government and the executive power headquartered in Santiago, this region has become the core of politics in the country. As such, problems in the Metropolitan Region are featured more in the news and the media seems to gravitate around the capital, overlooking the problems affecting the rest of the country.

Therefore, the effects of mass media on the coverage of some districts over others is another factor to take into consideration. In large constituencies, it is harder to cover all races across the country, hence a hierarchy is developed by news outlets to feature more competitive races that cover a larger territory (Clarke and Evans, 1983; Goldenberg and Traugott, 1987). Moreover, the general assumption is that media are
independent actors delivering the news, but when the outlets themselves have a political leaning, we could be observing differences in the content of the coverage as well (DellaVigna and Kaplan, 2007).

In this sense, the capital city region is more a battlefield where candidates run as partisan stars than hopefuls tied to the people of the constituency. This has a root in the literature as the often-derogatory term “carpet-bagging”, referring to candidates who run as geographical outsiders, placing less importance on building a local tie with constituents in favor of a more general partisan brand that advances similar policy points across districts with the same type of candidates (Childs and Cowley, 2011). Gallagher (1980) shows that in Ireland, aspiring members of the Dáil Éireann – the lower chamber of the Irish Parliament – outside of Dublin need to have strong local connections to be competitive (p. 491).

Thus, contrary to smaller districts where local politics is paramount for candidates to build their political careers (Gimpel et al., 2008; Tavits, 2010), we contend that the more notorious Metropolitan Region will be used as a laboratory for the development of promising candidates who over-performed in less salient districts, exceeding the expectations of their party despite losing. Consequently, this special kind of over-performer is given another opportunity to run in a different district, to form a commanding pair with other candidates – perhaps shuffled themselves – in a constituency that concentrates more attention and may be better to influence policy changes that favors parties. From this, we have our next claim:

**H3**: Losing candidates who electorally overperformed and ran in a capital city district are more likely to switch constituencies in their next race.
Lastly, under-performing candidates may be confronted to the end of their best days if they are veterans, or to a hard wake-up call if they are amateurs. A candidate who does not pass a key threshold could force parties to start moving on from them in favor of over-performers or more attractive recruits. An underwhelming electoral performance is the most pressing scenario for also-rans, given that failure here undermines the chances of staying in the same district, and does not help in getting out of it and exploring greener pastures either.

This calculus could be related to politicians and parties believing that because they were unable to muster a good electoral showing, their efforts will be better served in a presidential appointment or in the private sector. Therefore, the proposed most-likely outcome for this type of also-rans is retirement from electoral politics. Our claim is expressed below:

\[ H4: \textit{Losing candidates who electorally underperform in their district are more likely to retire from electoral politics, regardless of political experience.} \]

The dimensions of electoral experience and performance are a promising start to a more nuanced analysis of the fate of losing candidates. A more in-depth analysis of this group of politicians is overdue in the electoral politics literature, and the problems with availability of information for candidates who do not feature as prominently as winners can be a reason why researchers have not explored this. However, the dimensions explored here may be sufficient to jump-start a more systematic comparative analysis of the phenomenon.
Consolation Prizes for Legislative Also-Rans

This proposed theory builds from a system where also-rans are not only seen as residuals from hard-fought elections. In Chile, losers of elections are considered a valuable pool of candidates that not only were seen as legislative prospects but could potentially serve in positions of presidential trust. One alleged consequence of the binominal system for legislative elections was this “insurance policy” arrangement that rewarded good candidates who incurred heavy costs after running for a legislative doubling.

A legislative doubling – or doblaje – would secure both seats in dispute for the winning coalition within the district. But, the chance of that happening was very small due to both powerful coalitions presenting quality challengers across most of the districts. So, “coalitions face the conundrum of attempting to place their best candidates in races where they will gain high national exposure, but at the very real risk of defeat if paired with another strong candidate whose party has similar goals.” (Siavelis, 2005: 70). This implies that a significant group of also-rans would consist of quality politicians that need a larger incentive to run in elections they will most likely lose.

As we propose here and later analyze in chapter 3, parties give their candidates chances to come back for more legislative elections. But as we see in more detail in chapter 4, an “insurance policy” (Carey and Siavelis, 2003; Siavelis, 2005) was implemented by the coalition ruling the executive branch in the form of presidential

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25 Doblajes occurred in 65 districts across the seven legislative elections between 1989 and 2013, from a possible of 496 districts in dispute over the years. This is good for a 13% of the total races.
appointments. These are the many positions that a president needs to fill after inaugurated, like governorships, regional or provincial managers, as ministers within the cabinet, as ambassadors, or even as CEOs of public enterprises (Gil, 1966).

After the electoral reforms of 2013, however, the system to transform votes into seats changed into a more “proportional and inclusive” system, where third parties or coalitions could also elect some of their candidates into office. The district magnitude was increased from two across all lower chamber bailiwicks to at least three, and to as many as eight in some of them. By increasing competitiveness, the costs of losing an election have now decreased, and the expectation is that the performance and quality of candidates becomes secondary. As a consequence, the role of consolation prizes for good losers should diminish in the post-reform period.

For chapter 3, we measured electoral performance compared to previous candidates of the same coalition in the same district. In turn, for chapter 4 we created a marker for performance with the “first loser” for the coalition that ended up winning the presidential election. This means that the candidate who ended up the closest to a seat from all losing candidates in the district, who also belongs to the coalition that elected their candidate as president, will be classified as a first loser. With this, we can develop our first claim as follows:

\[ H1: \text{First losers from the coalition ruling the executive branch are more likely to be appointed to a position of presidential trust.} \]

Similarly, in chapter 3 we used electoral experience as a proxy for the quality of a candidate. For our second empirical chapter, we utilize the same marker in our models.

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26 To access the content of the new law, see https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=1077039
to determine amateurs and veterans, and we hope that the use of the in-between category for “local winners” provides some nuance as well. This measure captures those candidates who held a position as mayors of councilmembers in the past but have no experience in legislative elections. Then, our second claim states:

\[ H2: \text{Veteran also-rans are more likely to be appointed to a position of presidential trust.} \]

As stated previously, we consider these two dimensions of electoral performance and electoral experience as pivotal in the development of a comparative framework for the study of also rans. Appointments are not an exclusive mechanism of the Chilean system, but the evidence seems to suggest that they are used with the additional consideration of granting a consolation prize to good legislative losers who belong to the coalition that ended up winning the concurrent presidential race.

After the electoral reform of 2015, it becomes imperative to test the ramifications of the compensation system that was accepted by all actors after the first couple of legislative elections, and to see if that arrangement is still present after the institutional change. If the claims that hold that the insurance policy is a result of the now-defunct binomial electoral system, then we should expect less appointments and a falling out with the mechanism from the current presidential administration. However, we generally do not expect that to be the case.

**Conclusions**

This chapter reviewed the case of Chile in more detail, looking at the authoritarian Pinochet days that shaped the electoral rules kept in place and mostly unchanged for the democratic period between 1989-2013. In addition, we established
the framework to analyze the two most powerful coalitions during this period, the *Concertación* and the *Alianza*. As two resourceful groups of parties, the dynamics of these two blocs function similarly to the two parties in the American party system.

This way, we observe similar outcomes with most of the seats being filled by members of these two coalitions, and appointments favoring the coalition that won the concurrent presidential election. The particularities of the Chilean system after the 1980 constitution set up a legislative electoral system with all districts having a magnitude of two seats, which tends to favor the second-most voted group while also limiting outsiders.

In addition, we showed the importance of the Chilean case to analyze the situation of also-rans in electoral politics. The critical junctures that led to the development of the *binominal* electoral system are distinct enough, but also not exclusive to the country. Therefore, this case can become the fertile ground to develop a generalized theory for losing candidates that extends to more countries across time.

There are two ways in which losers of elections can remain relevant actors. These constitute two dynamics that we can witness after following the Chilean experience. First, good also-rans can be re-nominated for the same seat in the next election. Then, they can be appointed by a president to a position in the executive, if they belong to the same coalition, or in very exceptional circumstances. In the two following empirical chapters, we explore the conditions that could allow for one of those outcomes to occur, highlighting the notion that not all losers of elections are the same. Therefore, how a candidate loses an election can make all the difference when assessing their prospects and the possibilities that parties give them in the future.
For chapters 3 and 4, we constructed an original database with all losers from the eight legislative elections celebrated between 1989 and 2017. Some limitations in our data are related to the lack of information on the age of the politicians, the careers they had before running, and the finances of their campaigns, as these indicators are hard to obtain for all candidates in every district and across all years of study. However, our aim with this project is also to develop a comparative framework for the study of also-rans. So, relying on variables that can be found across all contexts is a strength to develop generalizable claims for losing candidates across different electoral contexts.

In general, we expect some losers of elections to have better prospects than others. Besides those also-rans who retire because of old age or personal considerations, there will be other unsuccessful candidates who become afterthoughts by their parties due to a bad performance. Similarly, there will be candidates who are invited back for another try at the same seat, while others may experience a different outcome, like being moved to districts that might suit them better. Further, attractive challengers can be tried in some bailiwicks and depending on their performance, could be moved to pursue a higher seat later in their careers.

We adventure on some of the factors that could potentially be related to some of these outcomes, that we later test in chapter 3. Here, we develop four main claims that build on the experience and the performance of the also-ran to try to explain their future moves in the realm of legislative electoral politics. First, we expect over-performing candidates to be thought of as attractive candidates regardless of their experience, being re-nominated to the same seat in greater numbers than other types of losers. Second, we
claim that experienced candidates – those with more than one legislative election under their belts – will seek a higher seat in the future.

Third, we expect that candidates running in the capital city will be judged differently by parties. The effect of media outlets disproportionately covering Santiago districts and declaring some of them as competitive electoral battlegrounds, more relevant than most of the district outside of the Metropolitan Region, makes us think that there will be significant differences for the fate of candidates. Thus, also-rans from capital districts who performed better than previous candidates of the same coalition in the past will change districts in greater numbers than other types of losing candidates. Finally, retiring from electoral becomes a possibility for under-performing candidates.

Meanwhile, our exploration of presidential appointments as a reward mechanism for good losers in chapter 4 starts with a replication of the work of Carey and Siavelis (2003) and their classification of attractive losers as “bridesmaids”. Later, we rely on our original database to create statistical models to capture the determinants of these presidential namings over time, while comparing the situation before and after the electoral reform. We test two claims that are related to the electoral experience and the electoral performance of the also-ran.

Thus, we expect that losers who ended up the closest to a seat in a district and who belong to the coalition that won the concurrent presidential election, will be appointed in greater numbers than other types of also-rans. Then, we expect some differences in the appointments for experienced candidates compared to amateur candidates, with the former type of also-ran having a greater likelihood of getting a position in the executive than the latter.
Over the first couple of elections since the return of democracy in 1989, Chile tested its new institutions and developed mechanisms to make the transition process smoother. Part of these mechanisms heavily involve also-rans, as parties are always aware of their role in the political process and are willing to take chances on the best of them. Good politicians can become scarce in a democracy, and losing an election is not a death sentence for a significant group within this larger pool of unsuccessful candidates.

We believe that with these two measures of candidate performance and candidate experience for unsuccessful politicians, it is possible to develop a first stage of analyses to properly assess the role of also-rans in electoral politics, or as part of future presidential administrations. With time, and with increasingly more information about races across democracies, we can improve data collection on electoral competitions following a framework concerned about all candidates equally. This way we can find out what makes some previous losers stand out, while others remain in the shadows of the victors.
Chapter 3: The Re-Nomination of Losing Candidates

Performance and Experience as Signals to Parties

We have advanced that two different dimensions – one before and one after the elections occur – affect the fate of losing candidates to a great degree. These dimensions are related to the electoral experience and the performance of also-rans. Before the election, parties and candidates know the experience of their candidates, and after elections have passed, their vote shares are one more criterion to judge them. The different degrees of experience and performance are clear markers that parties follow to make decisions on the future of unsuccessful candidates and can help explain the different paths that they follow after an electoral defeat.

Under a rational choice scenario, parties are thought to be acting for their best interest and choosing from a limited set of goals. After they witness some of their candidates lose tough elections, they are put into the situation of having to decide if some losers will be called back into the fold for a future contest. Under the framework of free-riding advanced by Olson (2002), we can think of good losers as strong individual actors who contributed to the collective goal of the party, which is mostly to win elections. In turn, losers who under-perform may be seen as deadweight, and ultimately as free-riders who obtained a political good without contributing (Green and Shapiro, 1994: 9).

Here, we observe a clash between the individual goals of politicians, and the goals of parties as they see themselves as individuals within a larger party system. In his seminal work regarding the goals of legislators once in office, David Mayhew (1974)
establishes that these politicians are “single-minded seekers of reelection” (p. 5-6) who depend mostly on their actions for their career advancement, rather than on a partisan label. Despite some criticism for an overt simplification of the scenario (see Aldrich and Rohde, 2001; Pearson, 2008), when extending this theory to include losers of legislative elections, we can flip the role of the actors. Thus, we can assume that political parties will have continuous reelection in mind, treating also-rans as instruments to their ultimate goal.

However, exceptional situations can occur when an also-ran is competitive in a tough district, holds some degree of experience, or retains a general degree of attractiveness despite electoral defeat. For example, we can conceptualize a distinct unsuccessful candidate with a strong appeal to one district. In these situations, parties can think of giving another opportunity to candidates who made a name for themselves in the district, attracting more voters than a new challenger would have. It is possible that “the rest of us cannot understand the representative-constituency relationship until we can see the constituency through the eyes of the representative” (Fenno, 1977: 883). Thus, a continued relationship between an also-ran and their constituency can reap positive outcomes after parties give hopefuls another opportunity.

Moreover, these new chances for attractive also-rans may come with the expectation of some campaign or discourse modifications before receiving a call-back. Losing an election could have been part of the expectation for some candidates, but in most cases, suffering a setback will not increase the enthusiasm from parties towards their candidates. So, for politicians who supported an ultimately unpopular decision, a
conditional re-nomination may be in the cards if that support is spun effectively (Davis and Glantz, 2014).

Similarly, a focus on traits that are evaluated positively by voters can give new life to a left-for-dead campaign. If a candidate can become notorious by highlighting a positive trait while linking it to policy proposals, their attractiveness can increase significantly (Arbour, 2014; Funk, 1999; Salmore and Salmore, 1989). However, there is evidence on the use of negative frames from opposing candidates having a greater effect than frames where candidates are lauded for having a good feature (Klein, 1991; Lau, 1982; Meffert et al., 2006). So, candidates should be strategic in the use of their personal features and the frames they use on their opponents. But if successful, they can significantly sway voter evaluation and eventually, their vote choice.

Overall, we see that a combination of candidate action and party calculations can yield a significant group of also-rans a new opportunity to run for a seat they were unable to secure in the past. If candidates surpass the different thresholds placed by their parties, former also-rans can become the hope of a party in a district. Conversely, if hopefuls are unable to jump all the hurdles, they could be staring at a switching to a seat at a lower election, or to retirement from electoral politics altogether.

Our theory chapter, coupled with this discussion about rational choice and candidates’ personal features, shows that losing an election is not a sufficient condition to group all also-rans the same way. Therefore, losers of elections are not a monolithic group, as candidates have several avenues for the improvement of their campaigns while parties have ample space to modify their expectations for their candidates.
Database, Variables and Operationalization

This project explores legislative elections from the point of view of also-rans. Over the first eight elections since the return of democracy in Chile, there have been 4,466 total candidates for the 1,170 seats in dispute over the years. This leaves 3,296 also-rans, 2,876 for the Chamber of Deputies and 420 for the Senate. Percentage-wise, this means that 71% of the candidates for the Senate were unsuccessful, while over 75% of candidates for the lower chamber were not able to secure the seat. With these numbers so high, why do we observe losing candidates coming back for future elections? What makes a previous unsuccessful candidate come back and run at another legislative election? This project explores these and other questions in more detail.

The theory on losing candidates proposed in the previous chapter advances two main considerations from parties and candidates after losing an election, one before the election and one after the races are over. The *ex-ante* criterion is related to the electoral experience of the candidates while the *ex-post* marker is their electoral performance. Then, it is advanced that less experienced politicians will be expected to perform better electorally in order to continue running for elections in the future, while performance is less important when politicians have passed a threshold of electoral experience.

The table below shows the number of also-rans who experience one of the four outcomes highlighted in this project. Since we do not know the fate of 2017 candidates, the total pool of losing candidates shrinks from 3,296 to 2,382 for the seven elections between 1989 and 2013. We see that these four outcomes cover more than two-thirds of all the results for also-rans. What completes the picture are the 593 (24.9%) losing
who ran for a municipal seat, not returning to the legislative,\textsuperscript{27} the 86 (3.6\%) that were re-nominated for the same seat but after a hiatus, and the 58 (2.4\%) who sought a lower election seat, moving from the Senate to the lower chamber.\textsuperscript{28}

Each one of these outcomes are the dependent variable featured in the four statistical models shown later in this chapter. The first dependent variable captures candidates who obtained a re-nomination to the same seat in the very next election, so this differs from candidates who came back to compete in legislative elections to different seats, or to the same seat at a later election. What we want to measure here are the factors that affect an immediate callback to compete in the next election despite electoral failure.

Table 3.1: Four outcomes for losing candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Re-nomination</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher election seeking</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within-chamber district change</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>1,176</td>
<td>49.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,645</strong></td>
<td><strong>69.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Prepared by author with information from the Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/

\textsuperscript{27} For a model exploring the determinants of this outcome for these losing candidates, see the appendix section.

\textsuperscript{28} Additionally, 69 also-rans were re-nominated for the same seat in the next election and yet sought a local seat in the next local election two years later, with only five winning their elections. Three of these politicians won their municipal seats but had to leave the post in the middle of their terms to run for the legislative seat once again, while the other two served the four years at the local level because their legislative seat was a senatorial seat where the wait is eight years.
The second dependent variable featured in our models captures losing candidates who sought a higher election seat in their next race. Seeking a higher election is achieved when a candidate moves from the House to either the Senate or the presidency, or from the Senate to the presidency from one election to the next. The table below shows the jumps losing candidates made to end up running for a higher election. Most of the also-rans (55) who moved to a higher election did from the chamber of deputies to the Senate, while three moved straight from the lower house to the presidency, and five went from the Senate to the presidency.

Table 3.2: Also-rans seeking a higher election seat, 1989-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>Presidency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/

Of the five also-rans who sought the presidency after losing a Senate election, we have the case of Ricardo Lagos, eventual president of Chile from 2000-2006. Lagos ran for one of the two seats of the 7th senatorial district in 1989, representing the western part of the metropolitan region that includes the capital city, Santiago. Despite obtaining a 30.62% of the votes and ending up in second place, his coalition was not able to double the vote share of the second-most voted coalition. This meant that the most-voted candidate of the second most-voted coalition, the Alianza, was awarded the second seat for this district.

However, Lagos was a very well-known politician in the years prior to the end of the Pinochet dictatorship as president of the Partido por la Democracia (PPD). He
increased his recognition after appearing on television in 1988, sentencing the end of the Pinochet term and accusing his administration of human rights abuses and encroaching in power after promising to leave shortly after the 1973 military coup. After his defeat in the Senate, he was named minister of education by the first president after the return of democracy, Patricio Aylwin.

Later, in 1993, he was defeated in the Concertación presidential primary by eventual winner Eduardo Frei by a wide margin, of 63% to 37%. After winning, Frei appointed Lagos as Minister of Public Works, a position that kept him with a degree of notoriety, building enough political capital to become Frei’s successor. He competed in the Concertación presidential primaries again, this time defeating his coalition partner in 1989, then-elected Senator Andrés Zaldívar (Siavelis, 2005). Eventually, Lagos defeated center-right politician Joaquín Lavín, a successful mayor in one of the richest municipalities in the country, Las Condes, and another also-ran in the 1989 legislative election.

Then, the third dependent variable is a district change for a candidate. This is observed when an also-ran appears in the following election competing for a different electoral district, but within the same chamber. Candidates who made this change are marked with a 1, with 0 otherwise. The within-chamber distinction is important given that some politicians who changed districts also sought a higher election seat, so it is important to not include observations that are already in one of the classifications into this one.

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29 https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB925423115611670114
Of the total 187 losing candidates who changed districts within the same chamber, 167 did it within the lower chamber while the other 20 did it within the Senate. The candidate with the most changes of district within a chamber is the Partido Humanista (PH) member Wilfredo Alfsen, who changed senatorial seats four times every four years from 1993 through 2005 – changing back and forth between two districts the entire time – and later in 2013 and 2017 in two different districts. He lost every race.

The fourth and final outcome of interest happens when the candidate retires from electoral politics after losing an election. In our classification, candidates who do not appear in another legislative, local, or presidential election after losing the previous race are considered to be retired from electoral politics. With that said, some candidates have come back after many years in the sidelines, so some of the people that today we mark as being retired will perhaps come back in a future election. For example, there are three candidates in the sample that came back to fight for a legislative seat after 28 years of inactivity. In other words, these candidates ran in the 1989 elections and came back in 2017.30

As to the independent variables added to capture the four different outcomes expected for most also-rans, we have first a variable pertaining to the relative electoral performance of the also-ran, compared to previous candidates. For this, we created an

30 One of these candidates found success at the local level for many years and used the notoriety from the first election – that he lost – to become relevant in a lower election. In 2017 he won the senatorial seat he was seeking. Meanwhile, the second candidate sought to become a representative at the local level but was not successful. Lastly, the third candidate ran for a deputy seat in 1989, accrued no electoral experiences in that 28-year window, running for a senate seat in 2017 with no success.
indicator that shows the differential between the vote share of the candidate and the vote share of the most-voted loser in the previous election for the same district (*First loser differential*). The idea here is that if a candidate’s performance surpasses the vote shares of the most-voted loser in the same district in the previous election, parties will take notice of this and reward this candidate with another shot at a legislative seat more than candidates with a lower differential.

**Figure 3.1: Distribution of differential between vote shares of also rans and first loser vote shares in the previous election, Chilean legislative elections 1989-2017**

Figure 3.1 shows the mean of this differential is -12.6%, which signifies that a losing candidate gets a negative differential between her vote share and the vote share of the first loser in the previous election for the same district, on average, of almost -13%. The greatest negative differential is observed at -30.2%, while the greatest positive differential for an also-ran is 18.2%.
Second, we have an indicator of electoral experience with three categories, two differentiating between types of amateurs, and one capturing veteran politicians. Amateurs are all those candidates in their first legislative election. The baseline category for the models includes amateur also-rans with no previous experience in electoral politics, while the other type of amateur hopefuls has no experience in legislative politics, but they have experience at the local level by having held a municipal seat in the past. These local winners have municipal experience but are still amateurs at the legislative level. Finally, veteran candidates are all losing politicians with two or more legislative elections of experience.

Table 3.3: Losing candidates by their political experience, 1989-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amateurs (%)</th>
<th>Local winners (%)</th>
<th>Veterans (%)</th>
<th>Totals (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>241 (80.1)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60 (19.9)</td>
<td>301 (9.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>251 (68.2)</td>
<td>14 (3.8)</td>
<td>103 (28)</td>
<td>368 (11.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>164 (56.8)</td>
<td>18 (6.2)</td>
<td>107 (37)</td>
<td>289 (8.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>187 (59.9)</td>
<td>17 (5.5)</td>
<td>108 (34.6)</td>
<td>312 (9.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>211 (61.3)</td>
<td>41 (11.9)</td>
<td>92 (26.7)</td>
<td>344 (10.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>278 (70)</td>
<td>26 (6.6)</td>
<td>93 (23.4)</td>
<td>397 (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>678 (74.2)</td>
<td>83 (9.1)</td>
<td>153 (16.7)</td>
<td>914 (27.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2,381 (72.2)</td>
<td>199 (6)</td>
<td>716 (21.7)</td>
<td>3,296 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/

The table above shows the number of inexperienced amateurs, local winners with no legislative experience and veterans throughout the eight legislative elections celebrated in Chile since 1989. Given that democracy was restored shortly before 1989
and the last time Chile celebrated elections was in 1973, there are no local winners nor veterans for the first year. Thus, all 371 losing candidates in 1989 are in the amateur category. Additionally, since the first local election was held in 1992, no winner of a local election sought a legislative seat – and lost – in 1993.

**Figure 3.2: Distribution of electoral performance of losing candidates by their electoral experience, Chilean legislative elections 1989-2017**

To show the importance that this indicator has for parties, we see that from the ten politicians with the worst differential, eight retired from electoral politics and two sought a seat in a local election that were unable to win. In contrast, out of the ten also-rans with the best differential, four retired, three were re-nominated, and one switched

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31 Despite being re-nominated, one of these losing candidates sought a mayoral seat in 2016, in one of the municipalities within the larger district in which she ran. This suggests that the party saw her as an asset to present for a municipal seat while keeping the re-nomination as a consolation prize if she lost that election. In the end, she came back for the legislative seat and won in 2017. The second also-ran who was re-nominated lost his 2009 bid, took an 8-year hiatus and unsuccessfully ran for a different district. The third also-ran won his next election in 2005 and is currently an incumbent member of the lower chamber despite losing once again in 2013.
her district within the lower chamber to win the next election. Meanwhile, the other two also-rans sought a municipal seat, with one taking a 12-year hiatus from legislative elections due to him serving as a mayor for eight of those years.

The box and whisker figure above notes the distribution of also-rans in each of the three categories of electoral experience, by their electoral performance. The mean of the differential between the share of the candidate compared to the share of the most-voted loser in the same district for the previous election differs across the three groups.\(^{32}\)

The average differential for the group of inexperienced amateurs is almost -14%, while for local winners is close to -11% and for veterans is close to -10%. These numbers suggest that the electoral experience of a candidate is a relevant consideration when thinking about their fate in electoral politics.

**Table 3.4: Descriptive statistics of first loser differential (FLD) variable, by categories of electoral experience, Chilean legislative elections 1989-2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inexperienced amateurs</td>
<td>2,010*</td>
<td>-13.81</td>
<td>7.08</td>
<td>-29.47</td>
<td>14.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local winners</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>-10.67</td>
<td>7.35</td>
<td>-25.76</td>
<td>18.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>-9.67</td>
<td>8.94</td>
<td>-30.2</td>
<td>18.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The 2,010 observations are the result of the total 2,381 inexperienced amateurs minus the 371 observations from 1989, lacking a previous election for analysis.*

\(^{32}\) Three different t-tests were performed among groups of means to see if the differences in averages were significant. Results of the two-tailed tests were significant in the differences between the mean for inexperienced amateurs and veterans, and in the differences between inexperienced amateurs and local winners. The results were not significant for the difference between local winners and veterans.
Some control variables are added to the models as well. These variables are added to help identify the relationship between our independent variables of interest and the four dependent variables more clearly. First, it is expected that being an incumbent before losing the new race may have a different effect than being a challenger on the likelihood of being re-nominated, seeking a higher election, changing districts or retiring. Next, controlling for the coalition of the politicians allows us to capture any differences across groups of parties. Using independent candidates as the baseline category, we test the differences that being a candidate for the center-left Concertación, the center-right Alianza, and other satellite coalitions has on the four explored outcomes.

Then, the last three independent variables are an indicator of a Senate race, a marker for an election happening in a district that belongs to the capital of Chile, and a variable highlighting those candidates coming back from a hiatus. Respectively, a Senate race is expected to have a different dynamic than a lower chamber election, while candidates within the capital of Chile are subject to a greater degree of scrutiny and publicity, and these candidates could be treated differently by parties after an election. Lastly, a candidate coming from a hiatus – understood as a period of years longer than one term of the last election in which they appeared – from legislative elections may hold a different standing from a politician with no hiatus.

Ricardo Lagos was the highest-voted candidate that did not win a seat despite ending up in second place, 13.4 percentage points better than the Alianza candidate who obtained a seat in the 1989 Senate election. However, there are two candidates who ended up as the most-voted in their districts and yet could not win a seat. Returning candidate and previous also-ran for a House seat Enrique Lee finished with a 20.76%
of the vote in the first senatorial district running as an independent. However, he was unable to surpass the vote shares of all the candidates of the two biggest coalitions, who placed their most-voted challengers in the two seats in dispute.

Table 3.5: Summary of dichotomous control variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Observed</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent (baseline category)</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertación</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite coalitions</td>
<td>1,676</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts in capital city</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After hiatus</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.

The other candidate is Marisela Santibáñez, a former actress and television host, who got a 26.77% of the vote in the 30th House district in 2013 running for the Partido Progresista (PRO). Along with her running mate, they were unable to outdo the vote shares from the two biggest coalitions, who sent their candidates to fill the available seats. However, Santibáñez was re-nominated for the same seat in the next election and was able to win the seat the second time. The new electoral system with its proportional nature may be to thank for her victory.

With a centralized administrative system, Chile’s capital city concentrates most of the attention of the media and is the target for most policies. The addition of this
variable as a control is justified by the disproportionate degree of importance and notoriety that the capital city is granted by all actors involved in politics compared to other parts of the country. The Metropolitan Region, where Santiago is located, was divided into two senatorial districts with eight lower chamber constituencies contained in each of these bigger districts. Table 3.6 shows the number of losing candidates from the capital by year. Of those 671 candidates, 628 appeared in lower chamber elections.

**Table 3.6: Also-rans running in Metropolitan Region districts, 1989-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Also-rans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>671</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.

**Statistical Analyses**

The statistical models featured are the full models for each of the four outcomes proposed for losing candidates. We see that after controlling for coalition, year and type of election, there are some significant effects for the two variables of interest, which reflect the different degrees of experience and performance of losing candidates over

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33 The two senatorial districts are the 7th and 8th. The former covers from the 16th to the 20th House districts, plus the 22nd – an exclusive bailiwick for the municipality of Santiago, the 30th and 31st. In turn, the latter district covers from the 23rd to the 29th House districts, plus the 21st.
time. We also observe a significant effect of the capital city variable and its interaction with our indicator of electoral performance.

Table 3.7: Four logistic regression models with determinants of outcomes for also-rans, 1989-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Re-nomination</th>
<th>Higher election</th>
<th>Within-chamber district change</th>
<th>Retired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First loser</td>
<td>0.0805***</td>
<td>-0.0309</td>
<td>0.0134</td>
<td>-0.0361***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>differential (FLD)</td>
<td>(0.0134)</td>
<td>(0.0278)</td>
<td>(0.0153)</td>
<td>(0.00824)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local winner</td>
<td>0.381</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>-0.192</td>
<td>-1.084***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.301)</td>
<td>(0.763)</td>
<td>(0.448)</td>
<td>(0.220)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran</td>
<td>-0.335</td>
<td>1.187***</td>
<td>0.743***</td>
<td>-0.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.253)</td>
<td>(0.342)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital city dummy</td>
<td>-1.148***</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>1.182***</td>
<td>0.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.308)</td>
<td>(0.546)</td>
<td>(0.260)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital*FLD</td>
<td>-0.0570***</td>
<td>0.0153</td>
<td>0.0348*</td>
<td>0.0144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0220)</td>
<td>(0.0347)</td>
<td>(0.0190)</td>
<td>(0.0119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>0.259</td>
<td>0.392</td>
<td>-0.522**</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.197)</td>
<td>(0.338)</td>
<td>(0.251)</td>
<td>(0.122)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.693**</td>
<td>-0.276</td>
<td>-0.645</td>
<td>-0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.352)</td>
<td>(0.698)</td>
<td>(0.397)</td>
<td>(0.229)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>-1.319***</td>
<td>-0.692</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.401)</td>
<td>(0.544)</td>
<td>(0.276)</td>
<td>(0.147)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiatus</td>
<td>0.482</td>
<td>-0.348</td>
<td>0.0146</td>
<td>0.0269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.398)</td>
<td>(0.584)</td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td>(0.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.840*</td>
<td>-3.033***</td>
<td>-3.066***</td>
<td>-0.724**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.458)</td>
<td>(0.787)</td>
<td>(0.778)</td>
<td>(0.302)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations       2,011       2,011       2,011       2,011
Pseudo R²          0.0766       0.0685       0.0648       0.0417

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All models include year and coalition effects.

The first model looks at the determinants of re-nomination for the same seat in the next election. The results show a positive and significant effect for both the local winner variable – when compared to the baseline category of amateurs with no local experience – and the first-loser differential indicator. This suggests that when compared to inexperienced amateurs, also-rans with local experience are more likely to be re-
nominated to the same seat. Similarly, a greater differential in favor of the vote shares of the candidate with respect to the vote share of the most-voted loser in the previous election increases the likelihood of also-rans to be re-nominated in the next election.

Figure 3.3 shows the chance of re-nomination in the next election for also-rans across several cut points of the variable for the differential between the candidate’s vote share and the percentage of vote share for the first loser in the previous election in the same district. We see that at the lowest levels of the differential, and when keeping all else constant, losing candidates have a very low probability of re-nomination in the following election. Conversely, at high levels of this differential, the chances for re-nomination are greater, surpassing 30% close to the 12 percent mark of a positive differential.

**Figure 3.3: Likelihood of re-nomination to the same seat in the next election by first loser differential**
For the control variables, we see significant effects for the Senate and capital city dummy indicators. These effects show that compared to also-rans from the lower chamber, senatorial hopefuls are less likely to be re-nominated. Similarly, compared to the rest of the country, losing candidates who fought for a seat in the capital have a lower chance to be re-nominated for the same seat in the next election. The interaction term between capital city and the first loser differential is also significant with a negative direction, suggesting that candidates with a greater differential who ran in the capital are less likely to be re-nominated for the same seat in the next election.

Then, when compared to the baseline category of independent candidates, unsuccessful politicians from the Concertación are less likely to be re-nominated. Moreover, candidates in 2005 and 2013 are significantly different from those in the baseline category of the 1993 elections, with 2005 also-rans being less likely to be re-nominated and those in 2013 having a greater chance. Lastly, when compared to the lower house, losing hopefuls in Senate elections have a lower chance to be re-nominated, and losing candidates from the capital city have also the same significant effect.

For the second model, the only variable of interest that shows a significant effect for the likelihood of seeking a higher election seat is being a veteran, when compared to amateurs without previous local experience. This relationship implies that also-rans with two or more elections are more likely to seek higher election after losing compared to amateurs without previous local experience.

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34 The candidates for the 1989 election are left out of this statistical analysis due to the impossibility of creating the first loser differential variable.
to inexperienced amateurs. Lastly, Alianza candidates are less likely to seek a higher election seat compared to the baseline group of independents.

Figure 3.4 shows the differences in the probabilities of seeking a higher election depending on the electoral experience of the also-ran. We see that compared with the baseline of amateur candidates, hopefuls with two or more elections in the legislative branch are more likely to seek a higher election seat in their next race. With that said, the probabilities for this scenario are somewhat low. Compared to amateurs, who do not surpass a 2.5% chance at the highest predicted point, veteran candidates start their predicted probability of seeking a higher election seat at almost 3%, and they have a maximum predicted point of almost 8%.

**Figure 3.4: Likelihood of seeking a higher election seat in the next election by candidate experience**

A former member of the lower chamber after winning in 1993 and 1997 with the *Christian Democrats* (DC), Tomás Jocelyn-Holt took a hiatus from legislative
elections after losing his third re-election bid in 2001. Eight years later he ran unsuccessfully for a Senate seat, but that did not mean the end of his career, as he made another jump into a higher seat after passing the threshold of necessary signatures to run for president in the 2013 elections. Jocelyn-Holt ended up in last place of nine candidates in that election, ultimately won by Michelle Bachelet in a second round, with a 0.19% of the votes.35

The other only also-ran that made these two higher election jumps was the late Gladys Marín. She was a political activist and a member of the chamber of deputies for the Communist Party (PC) before the military coup of 1973. After the return of democracy, she ran for a House seat in 1993 obtaining the fourth-most votes but missing out on a legislative seat.36 Four years later, Marín unsuccessfully sought a Senate seat. However, she was an established left-wing figure and decided to run for the presidency in 1999, where she ended in a distant third place with a 3.19% of the votes. This was the election that elected Ricardo Lagos over Joaquín Lavín, two other also-rans, in the second round after no candidate was able to obtain more than 50% of the votes in the first round.

Moving on to the third model with the determinants of a district change within the same chamber, we see that the variable for the first loser differential has no significant effect by itself, but both its interaction with the capital city dichotomous factor as well as the capital city dummy on its own, with a positive direction. This means that losing politicians with a better differential and who are also running in the capital

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35 Electoral results for this presidential election are available in https://historico.servecl.cl/servecl/app/index.php?r=EleccionesGenerico&id=1
36 This was one of the 59 districts where a doblaje from the Concertación occurred.
have a higher chance to seek a change of district in the next election in which they participate, compared to also-rans who did not seek a capital city seat.

Figure 3.5 shows the likelihood of a district change at different points of the differential variable, separated by capital city districts. We see a significant separation between the chances of within-chamber district change for candidates in Santiago at around the -15% of the first loser differential. From that point on, candidates with a more positive differential are increasingly more likely to change districts, reaching close to a 20% chance at the zero point for the independent variable, and almost doubling at the maximum value for the differential. In turn, also-rans outside of the Metropolitan Region do not increase their chances to change districts at the same rate, achieving a 10% likelihood at the maximum value for the first loser differential.

**Figure 3.5: Likelihood of within-chamber district change by capital and first loser differential**
Lastly, the fourth model shows the determinants for an also-ran retiring from electoral politics. One of the variables for experience and the one for electoral performance have a significant effect on the chances of a losing candidate retiring, and both affect this likelihood negatively. Thus, when compared to inexperienced amateurs, local winners are less likely to retire. The coefficient for veteran candidates is also negative, but it lacks significance. In turn, candidates who have a better differential between their vote shares and the vote share of the first loser in the previous election have a lower chance of retiring as well.

Figure 3.6: Probability of retiring from electoral politics by first loser differential

Figure 3.6 shows the different probabilities of retirement from electoral politics at several points of the differential variable. Also-rans with very low differentials have increasingly high chances of retiring from electoral politics, and this likelihood decreases steadily for more positive values of the differential. At the lowest point of the differential, and keeping all else constant, losing candidates have a 60%...
chance of retiring. In turn, at the zero point for the differential, this probability goes down to almost 40%. Then, for the greater positive differentials, this chance goes down 10 percentage points more.

In general, it looks like an indicator of electoral performance is very pertinent to the fate of losing candidates. The better a candidate performs in comparison to previous challengers affects the chances of re-nomination and a district change positively, while it affects the chances of seeking a higher election seat and retiring negatively. In contrast, a marker for the electoral experience of losing candidates seems relevant as well. Results of the statistical analysis performed show that more experience helps in re-nomination attempts for local winners, and higher election-seeking numbers for veterans. Lastly, it disincentivizes retirement from electoral politics for local winners.

Conclusions

Losing candidates are an important part of electoral politics. Despite not winning a seat, they are a key part of the process in every election, they consent to being governed by winners, and some of these candidates become winners after modifying their strategies for upcoming elections. This project is the start of a more nuanced analysis regarding the fate of also-rans, and in particular, for the determinants of re-nomination for losing candidates.

Taking the Chilean legislative elections as the case study for this work, we see that a significant number of losers remain active in electoral politics, with many of them evaluating their futures following several factors, demonstrating that not all losers are equal. Generally speaking, candidates with more elections under their belts look better
prepared to continue in electoral politics. Similarly, candidates who over-perform relative to the previous most voted losing candidate in the same district are regarded better by parties when considering a re-nomination to the same seat.

It appears that the electoral performance of a candidate with respect to previous losers in the same district is the most significant marker for a successful return to electoral politics. This shows that political parties follow their candidates closely for informational cues that would distinguish these politicians from new candidates to nominate to the same seat. When there are enough cues to select the candidates who already lost an election over other candidates, parties decide to re-nominate the same candidates.

For future research, consulting data on campaign contributions and more demographic factors from candidates should add to the nuance in the results. Given the influence of money in campaigns, it is reasonable to expect that those also-rans who fundraise better should have a better chance at being re-nominated in the same seat, or maybe in a higher seat, in greater numbers than those unsuccessful candidates with lesser abilities to raise funds.

Similarly, knowing more details about the candidates themselves can bring more details into light. For example, older candidates may just be deciding to retire because they are old, and no other factor affect their calculus. Similarly, candidates that are young may consider it rational to lose a few elections and may decide to continue to run despite not being electorally successful, in the chance that at a later age and with some electoral experience they could compete in better foot against an incumbent.
This project is just the start of a more detailed study about losing candidates and political parties in electoral politics. We hope to have piqued the interest of more researchers and we hope to have contributed to the development of a comparative theory of also-rans. After all, many former unsuccessful politicians come back and run in different elections with varying degrees of success. Knowing which factors may help make some previous losers come back to the fold can help us understand – and even predict – the likelihood of a politician’s behavior when considering their future.

As a complement to this study, our next chapter looks at also-rans who were appointed to presidential positions of trust in the executive branch. We explore the determinants of these appointments and advance that electoral performance and experience are again at the forefront of the positive fate of losing candidates. Despite appointments of also-rans being a rare occurrence in Chilean politics, they have worked as a reward mechanism for good losers. Moreover, our data finds that despite the electoral reform of 2015, presidential appointments continue to be utilized as an insurance for good also-rans from legislative elections who also belong to the coalition that won the concurrent presidential election.
Chapter 4: Losing Candidates and Presidential Appointments

Chile’s “Insurance Policy” for Legislative Also-Rans

This project deals with the general omission from most of the electoral politics literature of the role of losers of elections over time. The previous empirical chapter dealt with the re-nomination of also-rans, and the statistical analysis featured in the piece found losers who performed better than the best also-ran in the previous election for the same coalition are more likely to be re-nominated for the next election. Similarly, the electoral performance and the experience of candidates creates also-rans who are more likely to stay in electoral politics, lowering the perceived effect that one electoral defeat can have on these politicians.

Therefore, losers of elections are not a residual category of candidates after elections are through. In fact, also-rans remain important actors in a country’s political process long after a race is decided. The case of Chile reflects the role of losers to a great degree, not only due to the results shown in the previous chapter, but also because of what became a common practice over the seven legislative elections between 1989 and 2013. The governing coalition, having an incentive to win most of the pairs of seats in all districts of magnitude two, benefitted from offering an attractive alternative to resourceful candidates who risked their political capital by running in competitive districts and assumed a heavy cost if they were to lose the election.

These “insurance policies” worked as rewards for good losers from the governing coalition, taking the form of presidential appointments like head of a department or ministry, a regional mayor or a provincial manager, or an embassy
position. Carey and Siavelis (2003) describe the process as follows: “For strong legislative candidates who take risks on the coalition’s behalf by attempting to double, insurance takes the form of a promise of attractive appointed positions in the government if one should fall short in the electoral competition” (p. 6).

These policies have been classified as one significant consequence of the implementation of the *binominal* system after the 1980 Constitution (Carey and Siavelis, 2003; Navia, 2005; Siavelis, 2002; Siavelis, 2016), and one more authoritarian enclave left from the Pinochet regime (Garretón, 1991). However, this system was also credited with bringing higher quality candidates to the fold because of the incentives for eventual losing candidates. The premises in this literature are twofold. First, the development of the “insurance policy” scheme for good losers stemmed from the presence of the binomial electoral system. Second, the presence of a high quality of candidates is mainly due to this system of incentives. If the latter claim were true, we would expect also-rans in a more permissive electoral system to have a lesser role in politics after their defeats.

This chapter evaluates both premises by looking at the presidential appointments of losing candidates before and after the 2015 electoral reform. As it will be explained below, one of the main changes of the electoral reform was the increase in the magnitude district for legislative elections. Such changed reduced the effective threshold for a candidate to be elected and lowered the risk for a high-quality candidate to unsuccessfully run for a seat. After an electoral reform where the doubling strategy is no longer available for coalitions, it becomes important to gauge what remains of this structure of consolation prizes and insurance for good losers of elections.
The empirical findings show that candidates who have lost legislative elections while showing a good electoral performance are still noticed by political parties and rewarded with appointments in the executive. This result is observable in both the period before and the couple of years after the reform, in the second term of President Piñera. Therefore, we contend that the effect of the binominal system on the insurance policy of ruling coalitions is overstated, as good losers can still secure good positions regardless of the structure in place, mainly because of their inherent quality. Thus, the removal of the districts with magnitude two – which helped foster a scheme for powerful candidates to run enticed by consolation prizes in case of defeat – does not appear to deter quality candidates from running, and appointments of good also-rans in positions of presidential trust do not seem to be diminishing.

Thus, our findings suggest that the new Chilean electoral system creates incentives for the recruitment of quality candidates as well as the appointment of good losers, similar to the previous electoral system. Particularly, also-rans who are “first losers” – thus, who end up closest to winning a seat by being the most-voted losers in a district – are more likely to be appointed in positions of presidential trust than other losers, both before and after the reform. This shows that regardless of the structure in place, quality also-rans do not go unnoticed by political parties nor coalitions and are appropriately rewarded for their efforts after representing the political groups in a contested election with limited seats.
Electoral Systems and the 2015 Reforms

Electoral systems are, in short, the varied ways of transforming votes into seats (Cox, 1997; Cox, 1999; Nohlen, 2004). They are a set of rules that consider, among other things, more or less proportionality, more or less cooperation, and more or less competition for political parties within a system. Just as all other mechanisms of government, electoral systems are not perfect (Libertad y Desarrollo, 2017; Nohlen, 2013). There is no one true way as to how our representatives will be selected, and many alternative views are backed up by reasonable arguments (Blais, 1991). At the same time, consequences of these choices are understood differently by political and social actors, so these systems are constantly subject to criticisms and appeals for reform.

One of the reasons for the change of electoral system in Chile, ultimately passed in 2015, was to eliminate the binominal arrangement that had been in place since the return of democracy in 1989. The Pinochet regime made sure to leave power with a document that would extend the neoliberal plans of the Military Junta, protecting these principles regardless of a return to democracy in the future (Couso, 2011: 396; Uggla, 2005). This arrangement rests on a district magnitude of two for all bailiwicks, and the D’Hondt method of seat allocation for coalition votes instead of the share of individual candidates.

Regardless of district magnitude, the D’Hondt method gives the first seat to the highest-voted group, and then it divides the number of votes of that group by two, running the same “auction”37 for another seat once again with the number of votes for

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37 A more mathematical explanation that relies on “selling” seats in an auction-style allocation can be found at https://www.ucl.ac.uk/~ucahhwi/dhondt.pdf
the other coalitions intact. Then, it allocates the next seat to the coalition or individual with the highest votes, immediately dividing the number of votes of this coalition by two. If one of these groups wins another seat after the new auction is ran, their original number of votes are divided by three before the next auction is performed, and so on and so forth until all seats are “sold off”. This formula is mostly concerned with minimizing the over-representation of the most over-represented party (Gallagher, 1991: 34).

This electoral system was convenient to keep a familiar political duopoly in place with a powerful right-wing presence despite being a minority in the polls (Cabezas and Navia, 2005; Libertad y Desarrollo, 2001; Rahat and Sznajder, 1998), but with the negative externality of shunning independent or third-party – or in this case, third-coalition – candidates (Carey, 2006). As noted in the previous chapter, the two most powerful coalitions in the modern Chilean party system are the center-left Concertación and the center-right Alianza. These two groups have fought tooth and nail for most of the high-profile seats in the country since 1989, and until 2018 remained mostly intact from their original formation.

While this method of assigning seats is proportional in nature, when coupled with a district magnitude of two it enforced very high entry barriers for low-support challengers (Navia and Sternberg, 2017: 51-2). Likewise, evidence shows that a low

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38 These two groups have received different names throughout their history. The Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia started as a coalition against the Pinochet dictatorship, while Democracia y Progreso sought to be the democratic continuation of Pinochet’s policies. This group changed its name to Unión por el Progreso de Chile for the 1993 elections, and to Unión por Chile in 1997, before settling for a handful of elections for Alianza. Currently, the ruling center-right coalition is known as Chile Vamos, while the center-right group disbanded after Michele Bachelet’s second presidential term ended in March of 2018.
district magnitude can stifle proportionality more than the electoral formula (Taagepera and Shugart, 1989), given the incentive for coalitions to seek both seats if they doubled the vote share of the rest of the participants (Salas, 2016). For example, if four coalitions presenting two candidates each ran in a 10,000-voter district, and coalition A obtained 5,400 votes, group B amassed 2,200 votes, coalition C 1,800 votes, and D got only 600 votes, both seats would go to coalition A. Running the seat allocation as an auction taking the highest number of votes for a seat, we see that coalition A gets the first seat easily. Then, after dividing the remaining votes of A by 2, we see that their 2,700 votes are still greater than the votes of the next most-voted group.

This unique set of circumstances incentivized parties and coalitions to recruit strong candidates in key districts for a potential doubling. As the coalition with the most parties and the one with the heritage of the fight against Pinochet’s dictatorship, the *Concertación* had an electoral advantage when coalescing two of the historical “three thirds”39 of Chilean politics (Bonilla et al., 2011; Navia and Sternberg, 2017; Scully, 1992; Tironi and Agüero, 1999; Valenzuela and Valenzuela, 1986). This meant that the *Concertación* could count on average on a greater vote share than the center-right coalition *Alianza*, but in order to obtain an elusive doblaje, both candidates needed to be of enough quality to sway enough votes from the right.

Given these conditions, the possibility of sweeping a district and placing both center-left candidates in the legislature was conceivable in most of the 60 House districts

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39 This refers to a moment in the presidential history of Chile where three distinct ideological currents succeeded each other in power: the Nationals – seen as a center-right force – placed Jorge Alessandri as president from 1958 to 1964; the Christian Democrats – placed in the ideological center – saw Eduardo Frei as president from 1964 to 1970, and Salvador Allende represented the Socialists and Communists – to the left of the spectrum – from 1970 until the military coup of 1973.
and the 18 Senate constituencies.\textsuperscript{40} However, doublings turned out to be rare due in part to the Alianza’s response of placing strong couples in key districts themselves. Thus, many strong candidates from the Concertación ended up losing their bid to double. Carey and Siavelis summarize this problem here: “The very imperative that leads coalitions to run strong pairs of candidates in districts where they seek to double threatens the electoral security of their best politicians” (Carey and Siavelis, 2005: 6).

So, as a response to those outcomes, an “insurance plan” for losers who do a good job for the party developed somewhat organically, assigning them a consolation prize if their races did not go well. To help mitigate this, electoral pacts assigned losing candidates to top jobs in the government or the opposition trenches, as a consolation prize to losing a seat that was very hard to obtain to begin with. The governing coalition had an easier time promising their potential losing candidates with a good consolation prize, given that the executive has control over many positions of presidential trust which can be used as a prize for a job well done.

This mechanism of rewarding strong candidates who lose elections was partly responsible for holding the governing coalition strong (Carey and Siavelis, 2005) and the political system stable while the country went through a transition period to a more consolidated democracy. At the same time, this arrangement helped summon candidates who were extremely well-connected, resourceful, and of high quality. So, parties had to think of an insurance system to keep those consolidated politicians in the spotlight regardless of electoral defeat. Therefore, not long after losing, many also-rans from the

\textsuperscript{40} The only district under the previous electoral system that ended up being extremely hard for the Concertación to even get one seat was district 23, covering the three richest municipalities in the country. Only in 1989, the Concertación was able to place one candidate in the House.
governing coalition ended up in cabinet positions, while opposition candidates were presented as resourceful challengers in notorious municipalities across the country, or as top political advisors within opposition parties.

The 2015 electoral reform eliminated the binomial system, replacing the fixed district magnitude of two across sixty Lower Chamber districts and 19 Senate districts, for 28 and 16 districts of varying magnitude in the Lower and Upper House, respectively. Five senatorial districts kept a district magnitude of two, but the new system eliminates the possibility of doublings as understood before the reform, because now lists are permitted to present $M + 1$ candidates – with $M$ being the number of seats to elect – and coalitions are formed of multiple parties each (Gamboa and Morales, 2016: 135).

Additionally, these changes have the potential of reducing the incentives for the two most powerful groups to bring candidates of higher quality to the fold, due to the lack of strategic battleground districts and the absence of consolation prizes for good losers. This suggests that legislative also-rans could become a less relevant class of politicians in Chilean politics. However, we think that the lack of a rigid structure like the one before the reform does not deter quality candidates from seeking to run in a legislative election. Therefore, coalitions that win the executive branch of government still consider losing candidates from these elections to complete their executive teams.

Consequences of the Electoral Reform

To gauge some of the differences between the period before and after the electoral reform, we first look at the rate of success for lower chamber incumbents to
retain their seats. The table below shows the total number of incumbents looking to win again and the incumbents who were successful at retaining their seat, along with the ratio of success for each. The percentage of incumbents seeking reelection in the first six races averages 74.3%, while the rate of reelection seekers decreases ten percentage points in 2017. Then, the success rate for incumbents goes from an average of 82.8% to a little over three quarters.

Table 4.1: Rate of incumbents seeking reelection and rate of success, Chilean lower chamber elections 1993-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incumbents</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>77*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Won</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This number is calculated over a total of the 120 existing seats in 2013, and not the 155 current seats in the lower chamber.

Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/

A second exploration concerns the rate of success for different types of candidates to win a legislative seat. Table 4.2 shows the percentage of seats won by three different types of candidates: amateur candidates, losers in the previous election, and winners in the previous election. There is a slight difference between winners in the previous election and incumbents, as the latter are considered winners who come back to the same seat in the next election. In turn, the former can be winners that seek different seats in the next contest.

For the period 1989-2013, candidates debuting in the legislative fray had an average percentage of success – given by the number of seats won divided by the total
seats available – of 26%. After the reform, this number increased to 37.6%. Meanwhile, losers in the previous election also experienced an increase in their rate of success, going from an average of 6.4% in the pre-reform period to a 14% in the post-reform period. Lastly, the rate of success for winners in the previous election decreased from an average of 64.4% to a 39.9%. These categories are not exhaustive, given that losers in earlier elections can skip a few races and come back later, but they collect most of the seats across time, making them the most comparable categories across time.

Table 4.2: Rate of victory for amateur candidates, losers in the previous election and winners in the previous election, Chilean legislative elections 1993-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>60.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>67.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>64.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>65.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>64.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>39.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/

Another consideration that is related to the previous one is the mean vote share that candidates need to win a seat. The figure below shows the average vote share needed for a candidate to win a seat for the eight elections from 1989 to 2017. For the first seven elections, the average vote share that a candidate needed to win a seat hovered
around 30%, but after the change, this average went down more than half, to almost 12 between both 2017 elections.

Particularly, the average vote share to win a senatorial seat between 1989 and 2013 was 30.9%, more than doubling the current number of 14.7% for 2017. This difference is even more pronounced for the House, as the average for the first seven elections was 30.4%, more than three times the current number of 8.7% for the 2017 race.

**Figure 4.1: Mean of vote share (%) for winning candidates, Chilean legislative elections 1989-2017**

![Bar chart showing mean vote share for winning candidates in Chilean legislative elections from 1989 to 2017. The chart includes data for both Senate and House elections, with a clear trend showing a decrease in vote share over time.](https://historico.servel.cl/)

Given the new incentives created by the 2015 institutional change, the 2017 elections mark the beginning of a new era of legislative elections in Chile, with interesting comparisons to draw before and after the change of electoral system. With a varying number of seats per district in the new legislative elections, the 28 House
districts depart almost entirely from the previous system. In this sense, we can expect that a larger number of parties, as well as independent candidates, will be able to obtain strong support to win a seat.

For the latter, the number of independents rose after the 2015 changes. Like we saw in 1989, new elections with open seats and with no incumbent advantage can serve as good battlegrounds for independent candidates to appear. For the Chilean case, there seems to be a compromise between candidates and parties, given that many hopefuls appear as independents but are still supported by one of the coalitions when they decide to run. This gives more freedom to candidates to appeal to moderates while still maintaining an ideological root to trace to one of the established coalitions.

**Figure 4.2: Independent, pact-supported independents and ratio from total candidates by election year, Chilean legislative elections 1989-2017**

Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/
Figure 4.2 shows the number of completely independent and independents supported by a political pact, as well as the ratio of these two categories over the total number of candidates for every election. Despite having by far the largest number of independent candidates supported by a party, 2017 does not feature the highest ratio of independent candidates over the total number of candidates. This happens in 1989, where almost one of every three hopefuls was an independent. Then, the highest number of completely independent candidates is observed in 2013.

The novel character of the 2017 elections, coupled with the increase of brand-new open seats and a wider space for more political alternatives, gave way for an increased role for both amateur and previous also-rans. But this does not necessarily translate into these elections suffering from a lower candidate quality. In the next section we explore how presidential appointments became a tool to gauge the quality of legislative candidates, and a mechanism to reward politicians who are seen as politically viable by political parties, despite experiencing electoral defeat.

**Doublings, Appointments, and the Fate of Losing Candidates**

We have advanced that the previous electoral system developed an insurance scheme for losing candidates who ran in competitive districts and had a significant chance to lose the election. The main objective was to double the vote share of other coalitions, but many times this did not occur. A *doblaje* happened when two candidates of the same coalition double the vote share of the second-most voted coalition and win both district seats, being a pivotal addition to the constitutional reforms of 1989.41

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41 See article 109 bis added in 1989 here: https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=30177&buscar=18799

100
Doublings occurred a total of 65 times over the first seven elections. Table 4.3 shows the doublings by year and by election, and by the coalitions that were able to win both seats in one district. In raw numbers, 58 doublings occurred in the lower chamber, and 59 of the total 65 were done by the *Concertación* coalition, who were also responsible for all the Senate doublings. The only *doblaje* that the *Alianza* coalition was able to pull systematically was in the 23rd Lower Chamber district, that combines arguably the three richest municipalities in the capital, Las Condes, Lo Barnechea and Vitacura. No other coalition was able to pull a doubling.

**Table 4.3: Number and rate of doblajes by election and year, and by coalition, 1989-2013 Chilean legislative elections**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>House (%)</th>
<th>Senate (%)</th>
<th>Concertación (%)</th>
<th>Alianza (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>11 (18.3)</td>
<td>3 (15.8)</td>
<td>14 (17.7)</td>
<td>0 (-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>12 (20)</td>
<td>0 (-)</td>
<td>11 (15.9)</td>
<td>1 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>11 (18.3)</td>
<td>1 (10)</td>
<td>11 (15.7)</td>
<td>1 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5 (8.3)</td>
<td>0 (-)</td>
<td>4 (5.8)</td>
<td>1 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>7 (11.7)</td>
<td>1 (10)</td>
<td>7 (10)</td>
<td>1 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1 (1.7)</td>
<td>0 (-)</td>
<td>0 (-)</td>
<td>1 (1.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>11 (18.3)</td>
<td>2 (20)</td>
<td>12 (17.1)</td>
<td>1 (1.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>58 (13.8)</td>
<td>7 (9.2)</td>
<td>59 (11.9)</td>
<td>6 (1.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/

With few doublings occurring, the mechanism of consolation prizes needed to be triggered constantly. “For strong legislative candidates who take risks on the coalition’s behalf by attempting to double, insurance takes the form of a promise of attractive appointed positions in the government if one should fall short in the electoral competition” (Carey and Siavelis, 2003: 6). One path for losers of elections is to be
appointed to positions of presidential trust, maintaining the potential to develop a political career while staying away from electoral politics. This system of consolation prizes relies partly on presidential appointments for the ruling coalition, so if a candidate from the coalition in power of the executive branch is enticed to run for a seat that it is likely they will lose, insurance policies like an appointment will follow the electoral defeat.

According to section 7 of Article 32 in the 1980 Constitution, the Chilean president is in charge of naming and removing at will ministers of state, under-secretaries, as well as provincial and regional delegates. Additionally, section 8 of the same article leaves ambassador and diplomat positions to the will of the president. These seats are the most politically salient, and it follows that presidents not only place people they trust, but also politicians that are trying to accrue their own political capital.

To assess where the losers in the Chilean legislative elections have gone over the years, we followed Carey and Siavelis’ (2003) framework and collected the information of 2,153 appointed positions by the president between 1990 and 2019. However, the authors only look at ministers, under-secretaries and ambassadors for the first three elections. Trying to minimize the Type 2 error, occurring when failing to detect an appointment because of a lack of exploration of some of these positions (p. 11), we expand their focus, looking at five main appointments a president can give: a cabinet position, a regional manager position (or intendente), a provincial gubernatorial position (gobernador), under-secretaries and ambassadors.

42 The text of the 1980 Constitution can be found in https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=242302
Currently, there are 24 ministries or departments, 16 regional manager seats, 55 provincial governor positions, 39 under-secretary positions (subsecretarías) and 73 embassies. In terms of reach, ministries are seats that cover the entire country, while managers and governors are restricted to regional issues. Meanwhile, ambassadors are delegates from the country in other territories.

The case of Michelle Bachelet is a successful instance of a trusted appointee who went on to create her own political capital, so much that eventually led to her becoming the first woman president in the history of Chile in 2005, and later in 2013. The pivotal moment that made people aware of her was in the middle of her stint as Defense Minister (2002-2004), where she was seen aboard a tank, ready to help people in need after heavy rainfall. Despite a paltry showing at the beginning of the Lagos presidency as Health Minister (2000-2002), Bachelet found a better fit as leader of the Department of Defense, given her family history with her father as a member of the military, tortured and killed by Pinochet’s military regime. In her two years, she served as a bridge between the military and the people, and voters noticed and rewarded her a few years later.

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43 Even though Chile has 56 provinces, the province of Santiago does not have a de facto governor position. In turn, it delegates all responsibilities to the manager of the Metropolitan Region, of which the Santiago province is a part.
44 These are not the only presidential appointments. There are also dozens of Subsecretarios (assistant secretaries) and over two hundred SEREMIS, or Secretarios Regionales Ministeriales (regional ministerial secretaries) to fill at the beginning of each term. In some cases, people have kept their seats despite a new president, but this group belongs to the minority, as most appointments respond to each president’s level of trust with the appointee.
45 The source of ambassadors from the Chilean Foreign Relations Ministry featured countries having their own representative in some years, while in others the same ambassador was concurrently in charge of other countries. Because of this, despite featuring 73 official embassy positions according to our research, Chile currently has 76 incumbent ambassadors.
46 For more, see https://www.lanacion.com.ar/el-mundo/todo-por-no-subirse-a-un-tanque-nid1241015
The information on these appointments was collected from several sources. For the ministers, under-secretaries, as well as provincial and regional managers, the official government sites contained some of the most current information, but some historical data was found through looking at www.leychile.cl, the website for the National Library of the Chilean Congress, and older newspaper notes from several Chilean newspapers like *El Mercurio*, *La Tercera*, *La Nación*, and several other regional outlets. In turn, ambassadors were found mostly at the general archives of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

**Figure 4.3: Appointments by type, 1990-2019**

![Bar chart showing appointments by type from 1990 to 2019](https://archigral.minrel.gob.cl/webrree.nsf/fsRepresentantes)

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, at https://archigral.minrel.gob.cl/webrree.nsf/fsRepresentantes

Various sites in the official Chilean Government website, at https://www.gob.cl/instituciones/

An important caveat about the appointment of ambassadors is found when looking at the distinction made between career and political ambassadors. These are not fixed positions, and are subject to the will of the president, but a career ambassador is an appointed representative who most likely studied in the *Andrés Bello* Diplomatic Academy, with an education centered more on foreign affairs and less on politics. The
value of these ambassadors can depend on the country and the goal of the administration, but as an example of the importance given to career ambassadors, Piñera’s first term as president set a threshold of 80% career ambassadors, with the rest being political appointments.

It makes sense to think that a career ambassador fits the job better, but there are special circumstances that could make a political appointment the better choice. We can think of a country in turmoil or with a particular need that only a close delegate of the president might help remedy. With that said, some political positions have been the target of scrutiny. Recently, at the start of Piñera’s second time at the helm of the executive, he faced backlash for the decision of appointing his brother Pablo as the ambassador to Argentina. But, a few days after the announcement, the President backtracked, but he made another political appointment, naming Sergio Urrejola Monckeberg, cousin of the current Housing Department Minister, Cristián Monckeberg.

Table 4.4 shows the total number of presidential appointments by administration, while also noting the years of each presidential term and a ratio of appointments by the midpoint of each administration. We make this distinction for two reasons: first, we expect presidential appointments made in the first months of a presidential administration to be linked to the insurance mechanism for good losers. Second, we want to make a fair comparison to the post-reform period, that only consists of the first two years of the Piñera government.

One caveat regarding presidential terms after 1989 is noted when looking at the Frei and Lagos administrations. These two presidents governed for six years each, but

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48 For more, see http://www.quepasa.cl/articulo/politica/2015/10/la-gran-deuda-de-la-diplomacia.shtml/
after the constitutional reform of 2005, the country went back to a four-year term.\textsuperscript{49}

Additionally, Frei was the only president who had two different sets of legislative also-rans to look at, from the 1993 and 1997 elections. This could help explain his lower percentage of appointments by the midpoint of his administration.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|}
\hline
President (Term) & Appointments (A) & First half of term (F) & F/A (%) \\
\hline
Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) & 237 & 180 & 75.9 \\
Eduardo Frei (1994-1999) & 320 & 186 & 58.1 \\
Ricardo Lagos (2000-2005) & 382 & 252 & 66 \\
Michelle Bachelet (2006-2009) & 313 & 201 & 64.2 \\
Sebastián Piñera (2010-2013) & 325 & 225 & 69.2 \\
Michelle Bachelet (2014-2017) & 336 & 221 & 65.8 \\
Sebastián Piñera (2018-2022) & 240 & 240 & - \\
Total/Average & 2,153 & 1,505 & 66.5 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Appointments by presidential administration, 1990-2018}
\end{table}

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs, at https://archigral.minrel.gob.cl/webrree.nsf/fsRepresentantes
Various sites in the official Chilean Government website, at https://www.gob.cl/instituciones/

The 240 appointments made by President Piñera in only two years seem large in comparison to previous governments. Hence, we added a column with the ratio of first half appointments over the total number made for each president. We can see that the first half of Piñera’s second term has the second highest number of appointments, only after Ricardo Lagos’ first half. And, with the average of ratios for other administrations

\textsuperscript{49} The document can be accessed here: https://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=241331&idVersion=2005-08-26
at 66.5%, we can expect close to 360 appointments in total throughout the Piñera administration, a potential all-time high.

These numbers show that appointments have increased in use by presidents over the years, and this spike could be triggered by the last three administrations receiving the executive power from the opposing coalition. The center-left *Concertación* coalition appointed positions of presidential trust after the 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2013. In turn, the center-right *Alianza* did it after the two elections won by Sebastián Piñera, first in 2009 and later in 2017. Arguably, new administrations have named more positions because of the removal of most of the previous presidents’ trusted people.

At the same time, the government has created more appointed positions over the years, when the Bachelet administration oversaw the implementation of the Department of Energy and the Department of the Environment, while Piñera promulgated the creation of the Department of Sports, the Department of Women and Gender Equality, and the Department of Science, Technology, Knowledge and Innovation.

Out of the 208 incumbents\(^5\)\(^0\)\(^5\)\(^1\) registered in those five positions, ten were losers in the 2017 election. Of those ten, one is the current minister in the Department of National Assets (*Bienes Nacionales*), another is the manager of the Aysén region in the south of Chile, five are provincial governors, two serve as under-secretaries and one as

\(^{50}\) At the time of finishing this dissertation, a cabinet switch triggered by social protests left two undersecretaries with no incumbent. Adding the three extra ambassadors for Ethiopia, Guyana and Iran, which are normally concurrent with Kenya, Trinidad and Tobago and Turkey, respectively, our incumbent total is 208.

\(^{51}\) Additionally, the Chilean ambassador to Argentina stepped down from his position in August 2019, but the President has yet to confirm this move and name a replacement.
the ambassador to Panama. Then, four more incumbents are 2013 losers, two are 2009 also-rans and two more lost in 1997, while the list is closed by one 1993 hopeful.

Moreover, 208 appointees had a legislative past, with 165 of them having lost a previous legislative race. Then, 190 appointees have gone to a legislative election after serving, with 119 of them losing the election they sought. Meanwhile, 22 politicians came from a legislative loss and went to lose another legislative election in the future. Finally, the number of appointees in these three positions to not have been involved in legislative races is 1,804.

Table 4.5: Appointments of legislative also-rans and effective number of candidates (ENC) by presidential administration, 1990-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential term</th>
<th>Former also-rans appointed</th>
<th>Average district ENC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990-1993</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1999</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2005</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2013</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014-2017</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018-2022</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total/Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>165</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.2</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chilean Electoral Service, at https://historico.servel.cl/

To see the extent as to how the winning coalition uses executive appointments as a mechanism to insure its also-rans a good place to land after electoral defeat in a legislative election, we can look at table 4.5, which features the number of former losing candidates appointed to each of the seven presidential administrations between 1990
and 2018.\textsuperscript{52} Then, using the formula for the effective number of parties championed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), we measured the average of the number of effective candidates (ENC) for all presidential terms, by district. This indicator helps us differentiate candidates who are electorally viable from those who are not, especially considering the changes brought by the 2015 electoral reform.

The table tells us that, despite having the second-largest number of appointments, and this number being only in Piñera’s midpoint of his administration, the average district ENC is almost three times higher as the one in Bachelet’s second term. These findings contrast with the previous information, so a further exploration of the phenomenon is warranted. The next section features two statistical analyses focusing on the determinants of an also-ran appointment while also making a distinction between the period before and the period after the reform.

**Statistical Analysis I: Carey and Siavelis (2003) replication**

This section features three statistical models, first we see a replication of the work of Carey and Siavelis (2003) on the determinants of the insurance policy used by the two main political coalitions in Chile for legislative also-rans for the period under the binomial electoral system. Then, we develop our own set of models to test the use of appointments for losing candidates before and after the electoral reform of 2015. Generally, these results show that losing candidates are pivotal to Chilean democracy, and that parties follow their performance closely. Throughout the seven elections with

\textsuperscript{52} It is worth noting here that President Frei (1994-2000) had two appointment instances, after the 1993 race where he was also elected and after the 1997 election. Meanwhile, President Lagos (2000-2006) had one instance of appointments after an election, following the 2001 legislative race.
the binominal system, legislative hopefuls who failed in their bids have been appointed to positions of presidential trust, and a better electoral performance from also-rans can help them land a presidential appointment in the next administration.

In their work analyzing appointments in the first three Chilean legislative elections, Carey and Siavelis (2003) develop the concept of “bridesmaids”. These are candidates who were on the lists of two candidates for a ruling coalition in the executive and failed to double. Thus, they were assumed to be in the shortlist for a presidential appointment after their electoral defeats. Only under two exceptional circumstances, the second-placed coalition candidate who lost the election was not considered a bridesmaid by the authors. First, if the ruling coalition after the election won no seats in the district, neither of the losers were considered to end in any type of coalition shortlist. Then, if the coalition won one seat but the other went to a coalition that was not the second-placed coalition, then the also-ran was left out of the bridesmaid consideration.

Below is a replication and extension of their work, adding the four elections under the binominal system from 2001 to 2013, and the 2017 election for the third model. It is worth noting that the *Concertación* was in power of the executive office in five of the seven presidential terms, so for Carey and Siavelis the center-left coalition was the only one making the bridesmaid calculus. However, in 2010, the *Alianza* won the presidency, and they repeated in 2017. To classify losing candidates as bridesmaids in this election, there were three criteria. First, all “first losers” belonging to the *Alianza* were immediately marked as a bridesmaid. Thus, if the fifth-most voted candidate in a district with four seats was from the center-right coalition, then that candidate was classified as a bridesmaid.
Table 4.6: Bridesmaids by chamber, 1989-2013 Chilean legislative elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Senate</th>
<th>Lower House</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>14*</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Chilean Electoral Service at https://historico.servel.cl/nav_historico.html

*The 1989 Senate election filled all 38 seats at the same time. Since then, the Senate has been electing 18 seats in one election and the 20 remaining seats four years later.

**This number is from a total of 127 losing candidates across 35 constituencies using the new electoral system passed in 2015.

Second, if the loser obtained at least a 10.3% of the vote, they equaled the average vote share for winners in the election, so they made the cut. Finally, all Alianza losing candidates who ended between winning candidates were marked as bridesmaids as well. Under the new electoral system, we witnessed many cases where one strong candidate from a party dragged their list partners with low vote shares to win a seat. This left many hopefuls with a greater vote share than those dragged winners without a seat. Table 6 shows the number of bridesmaids by legislative election, that hovers around 60 per election for the first seven contests.

With this sample of losing candidates, the authors developed a logistic regression model that includes three independent variables in order to calculate the likelihood of a bridesmaid candidate obtaining a presidential appointment in the next
term. They add the *chamber* variable, that captures Senate candidates versus Chamber of Deputies hopefuls; the *between coalition ratio* that divides the votes of the ruling coalition over the votes of the second most powerful coalition in the district of the candidate; and the *within coalition ratio*, that divides the votes of the winner over the votes of the also-ran from the same coalition.53

Results of the replication show a significant effect for the *chamber* variable and for the *within coalition ratio* for the 1989-2013 period, but not the post-reform period. These two indicators have the same direction proposed by the original authors. However, despite having the same expected direction, the significance is lost for the *between coalition ratio* variable in the 1989-2013 model. The logic for this ratio is to measure the collective performance of the coalition, and the larger it is, the closer to double the candidates from the opposition. But races after 1997 tended to get closer between coalitions, as there were only 27 doublings in the last four elections before the electoral system change, compared to the 38 in the first three races. Likely, this variable lost explaining power for the appointment of bridesmaids as the *Alianza* drew closer to the *Concertación* in votes over the years.

In turn, the within coalition ratio increased significantly after 1997, with a change from a mean of 2.23 for the first three races, to a 2.95 after the 1997 contest. The largest difference was seen in 2001, when a *Concertación* winning candidate obtained almost thirty times more votes than the bridesmaid, who obtained 788 votes for a 1.33% share. Plus, six of the nine bridesmaids with a ratio of over 10 times are

53 Carey and Siavelis (2003) name these two variables *coalition ratio* and *Concertación ratio*, respectively. But given that the *Alianza* eventually featured their own candidates in presidential nominations, we renamed these indicators.
found after the 1997 election, and none of them were appointed in the following presidential term after the election.\textsuperscript{54} Hence, the changes to both coalitions over the years appear to have made this indicator grow in explaining power for these models.

Table 4.7: Replication and extension of Carey and Siavelis (2003) logistic regression model for the likelihood of bridesmaids being appointed to positions of presidential trust by the executive, 1989-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chamber (Senate)</td>
<td>1.33***</td>
<td>0.940***</td>
<td>0.549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.53)</td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
<td>(1.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between coalition ratio</td>
<td>1.60**</td>
<td>0.281</td>
<td>0.644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.92)</td>
<td>(0.407)</td>
<td>(0.603)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within coalition ratio</td>
<td>-0.11</td>
<td>-0.363***</td>
<td>-0.384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.20)</td>
<td>(0.125)</td>
<td>(0.262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.99***</td>
<td>-1.403**</td>
<td>-0.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.72)</td>
<td>(0.606)</td>
<td>(0.905)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R\textsuperscript{2}</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.0656</td>
<td>0.0725</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Meanwhile, despite having the same direction as the previous two models, the variables in the post-reform period model do not hold statistical significance. Likely,

\textsuperscript{54} Interestingly, one of these bridesmaids with a ratio of 14 in favor of the winning candidate of the 
\textit{Concertación} in 2001, was named by Michelle Bachelet in 2017 as under-secretary of the Environment. He served less than a year, as Sebastián Piñera, from the opposition coalition, won the presidency that same year and started his term in March of 2018.
we need more elections and more observations to be able to find stronger correlations under the new system, or perhaps new models with a greater number of control variables, a different sample including all also-rans, and a different approach when dealing with the low number of positive occurrences. We tackle these shortcomings in the following section.

**Statistical Analysis 2: Presidential appointments for also-rans**

Having shown this initial analysis, we now move to the original statistical models for this chapter. To test the use of appointments before and after the reform, we develop a couple of models where our dependent variable is a losing candidate being appointed in the next presidential term after legislative defeat. Given that the rate of occurrence of appointments is low within the group of also-rans, we use a rare events model where the dependent variable is dichotomous. This model was advanced by David Firth (1993) and is similar to King and Zeng’s (2001) suggestion to reduce the bias in estimation.

The dependent variable in these models is a presidential appointment made in the first half of every term from the Aylwin administration in 1990 to the second Bachelet term from 2014-2018. We do this to compare results more fairly to the period after the electoral reform, which has only consisted so far of one half of one administration, the second Piñera term that started on March 11th, 2018, scheduled to end four years after that date.

Out of the total 165 appointments made by all presidents from the group of legislative losers of their coalitions, ninety-three of them were appointments done in the
following presidential term after the election. This means that after a race drew winners and losers, and a new president started their term, they named 93 former losers of the previous legislative election in their administrations. Moreover, that number is further reduced to 74 appointments when taking out those made in the second half of each administration. Lastly, 18 of those appointments were made in the Piñera term in 2018 and 2019, and the rest were made between 1990 and 2017.

The main independent variable for this model is the first loser for the ruling coalition (FLC) indicator, that captures good performers for the coalition that won the presidential election in each of the years measured. We classified a FLC as such if the candidate ended up as the first loser in a district and belonged to the eventual winning coalition. Thus, there is an element of strong electoral performance attached to this variable, because it is not enough to be the first loser in the coalition, but it must be the candidate closest to a seat in the entire district.

There are a couple of differences between the FLC variable and Carey and Siavelis’ bridesmaid indicator. First, given the higher threshold of being the first loser in the district while belonging to the ruling coalition, not all bridesmaids make the cut as FLCs. Then, some candidates that the authors’ original classification of bridesmaids left out are considered FLCs by our metric. For example, we include first losers that are in districts where there was a doubling. Thus, despite no candidates winning a seat for the eventual ruling coalition in a district, in some cases one of those also-rans was the first loser in their bailiwick.

The second difference is seen in candidates who eventually became part of the Concertación after 1989. That year, not only the Concertación was running as part of
the center-left. The *Liberal Party* (PL) and the *Socialist Party* (PS) had their own pact, while the *Ample Party of the Socialist Left* (PAIS) and the *Democratic Socialist Radical Party* (PRSD) ran in a separate group. These parties did not run under the same colors of the *Concertación* in 1989, but they either merged with groups in the winning coalition or joined them shortly after the elections were over.

Table 7 shows the differences between bridesmaids and first losers for the ruling coalition. We see that from the total of bridesmaids captured following Carey and Siavelis’ (2003) classification, only 280 make the cut as first losers. This group averaged a finishing position of 2.86 when including the 2017 elections, and 2.79 with that race in the mix. Meanwhile, the 168 bridesmaids who did not finish as first losers in their districts averaged a finishing position of 4.99 when counting the 2017 election, and 4.24 when leaving that election out.

**Table 4.8: Bridesmaids and coalition first losers, 1989-2017**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First losers</th>
<th>Not first losers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bridesmaids</strong></td>
<td>280</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not bridesmaids</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>298</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.

Moreover, we see that eighteen also-rans made the first loser classification and were not bridesmaids. Ten of these were politicians who ran for other left-wing coalitions in the first election after the return of democracy, eventually joining the *Concertación* shortly after 1989. Then, we have the four *Concertación* first losers in the doubling of the 23rd Lower Chamber district by the *Alianza* between 1993 and 2005, and the one suffering the same fate in 2013. The other three are first losers who could
not double along with their pact mates despite the *Alianza* not winning a seat in their districts.

**Table 4.9: Summary of variables included in statistical models**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Observed (N=3,296)</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DV model 1: Also-ran appointed (1989-2017)</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV model 1: Also-ran appointed (2018-)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First loser ruling coalition (FLC)</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local winner (municipal winner, inexperienced at legislative level)</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Alianza</em> in power</td>
<td>1,258</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts in capital city</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author.

Like in the previous empirical chapter, we include indicators of electoral experience into our models, and an interaction between the experience and the performance of also-rans. Thus, we measure the effect that having local experience, or more than one legislative election can have on the likelihood of being appointed after losing a legislative election, and a combined variable for the performance given by being the first loser for the coalition ruling the executive branch. Table 8 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the variables included in both models.

The total number of observations is the 3,296 losers of elections from 1989-2017, and we see the number of observations for each of the independent variables, as well as both dependent variables in the two models. As noted previously, both
dependent variables have low rates of occurrence, and our numbers are even lower given our comparison between first halves of governments only.

The first model analyzes the likelihood of being appointed in the first half of each of the six presidential terms from 1990 to 2017, and we see a positive and significant effect for the first loser variable. This means that from the entire group of losing candidates between 1990 and 2017, appointees are more likely to be hopefults ending the closest to a legislative seat in the previous election. Thus, in a district of magnitude two, third-placed candidates from the future ruling coalition stand a better chance to be called back for a role serving the president than candidates ending up in a worse position.

Additionally, it appears to be a significant effect for the Alianza government between 2010 and 2014, the first Piñera administration. This effect implies that losers from this coalition were appointed more by that president than Concertación losers were by their own presidents. This aligns with what Navia and Sternberg (2017) show in their work. For elections where control of the executive power shifted from the Concertación to the Alianza, high polling numbers for Piñera before the 2009 election created enough uncertainty for the latter coalition to develop a strategy with strong pairings of candidates to try to obtain their own doublings. When some of those did not materialize, but Piñera was able to secure the presidency in the concurrent election, notorious also-rans of the center-right coalition were placed in positions of presidential trust.
Table 4.10: Rare events logistic regression model for the determinants of an also-ran appointed in the first half of the following term, 1990-2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Appointed in first half of next term (1990-2017)</th>
<th>Appointed in Piñera administration (2018-present\textsuperscript{55})</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First loser ruling</td>
<td>3.162***</td>
<td>3.859***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coalition (FLC)</td>
<td>(0.382)</td>
<td>(0.887)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local winner</td>
<td>-0.723</td>
<td>0.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.455)</td>
<td>(0.631)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran (two or more elections)</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>-0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.529)</td>
<td>(0.753)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local winner*FLC</td>
<td>1.511</td>
<td>-1.884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.585)</td>
<td>(1.951)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran*FLC</td>
<td>-0.637</td>
<td>-0.492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.637)</td>
<td>(1.488)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza in power</td>
<td>1.099***</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.348)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>1.013***</td>
<td>1.009*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.333)</td>
<td>(0.604)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Region</td>
<td>0.205</td>
<td>-0.00547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.331)</td>
<td>(0.587)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>-0.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.369)</td>
<td>(0.502)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.359***</td>
<td>-4.066***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.350)</td>
<td>(0.416)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,382</td>
<td>914</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

\textsuperscript{55} The last appointment included in the database was the one of Felipe Guevara as provincial manager (intendente) of Santiago, made on October 30\textsuperscript{th}, 2019.
Then, losing candidates who ran for Senate seats are significantly more likely to be called for an appointment than lower chamber hopefuls. Lastly, the variables for the interactions between experience and performance do not yield significant effects. Hence, these results suggest that electoral performance is a strong indicator to political parties – which are soon to be ruling the executive branch – that candidates running under their colors are attractive enough to obtain a job working for the eventual winning presidential administration.

Moreover, the second model shows the determinants of a 2017 legislative loser ending as an appointee for Piñera’s second presidential administration. The effect for the first loser variable is again positive and significant, suggesting that despite the change in electoral system, it is still pivotal for the parties that end up in power of the executive branch to look at the performance of their candidates in the legislative election to assemble their executive teams. And once again, the Senate appears to be the preferred chamber from which to select also-rans, as the effect of belonging to this list of candidates is significant over the Chamber of Deputies hopefuls.

**Conclusions**

The reform of the Chilean electoral system in 2015 provided us with an opportunity to explore the mechanism of presidential appointments and the role of legislative also-rans both before and after the change. The main contention for this chapter was to explore any differences in the use of the “insurance policy” system of rewards for good losers in legislative elections. In these races, all with a district
magnitude of two, powerful challengers risked plenty when running with the goal of doubling the opposing coalition. However, the likelihood of that occurring was slim.

We took two roads to look at this phenomenon. First, we replicated and expanded Carey and Siavelis (2003) work on the determinants of appointments for legislative losers. Following their concept of “bridesmaids”, we captured all candidates who became potential beneficiaries of a consolation prize from a presidential administration that understood the risk those candidates were taking. Looking at three legislative elections, from 1989 to 1997, the authors found that Senate candidates are more likely to be appointed than Chamber candidates. Similarly, an indicator of collective performance for the center-left coalition Concertación positively correlates with the likelihood of an appointment.

Our extension took those same variables and added the four elections before the electoral reform, from 2001 to 2013, as well as the 2017 election, to test their effects on presidential appointments. We found a similar effect for the Senate variable, but the effect for the collective performance was not significant. In turn, the marker for individual performance compared to the winning candidate of the same coalition was now significant, suggesting that bridesmaids who under-performed compared to fellow politicians who moved on to win a seat were less likely to be appointed.

The second tactic we followed was our own set of statistical models capturing a set of potential determinants of a presidential appointment. Expanding the sample to all losing candidates across all eight legislative elections without any previous classification, we tested independent variables that reflect candidate experience and performance, and controls for the coalition in government, the chamber, the capital city,
and the sex of the hopeful. Results show that first losers, i.e., those candidates that end up the closest to winning a seat, are strongly correlated to a future appointment.

Thus, we see once again that the electoral performance of a candidate is strongly and significantly correlated to a future presidential appointment. This result not only holds up across all elections under the same electoral system, but also for the elections using the new electoral system. This latter point shows that the system of consolation prizes given to candidates who risked a significant blow to their political careers by running for seats they may not win remains in place, as parties are still paying attention to candidates who over-perform.

All in all, these findings put the notion that the “insurance policy” system developed first by the Concertación and later perfected by the Alianza was a direct consequence of the binomial electoral system to the test. Our models show that legislative also-rans are a valuable pool of politicians who can be recalled for significant positions in newly formed presidential teams, regardless of the replacement of the more rigid electoral system for a more inclusive and proportional one.
Summary and Discussion

Chile has been studied as a country for its long-lasting military dictatorship, an exceptional popular election that ousted the General who believed had eight more years of rule guaranteed, a model of a transition to democracy, and a unique electoral system for the legislative branch. And after current events, we may get to see a country that went through a constitutional reform referendum after civil protests that led to this change. In this opportunity, the country served as an ideal case to demonstrate the importance of losing candidates in popular legislative elections, as well as for presidential administrations.

This project is threefold. First, we developed a novel comparative theory about losing candidates, making the case that also-rans are not residuals to the electoral process. This project contends that not all losers are the same, and two things are vital for their prospects as return candidates. First, political parties take into consideration the electoral experience of a candidate before placing them in a race for a seat. And second, after elections are over, they gauge their electoral performance compared to previous candidates. Thus, parties decide differently on the fate of their candidates moving forward, based on these two moments.

Second, we investigated the determinants for four different outcomes for losing candidates, including the re-nomination of also-rans. We found that candidates who over-perform in their races have a greater chance of re-nomination to the same seat in the next election. The role of electoral experience is also significant, as veteran candidates who lost an election are less likely to retire from electoral politics and more likely to seek a higher election in a future race. This entire process is vouched for by
political parties, that decide who stays and who goes according to the performance and experience of losing candidates.

Lastly, we tackled the notion that the removal of the binominal system could decrease the use of presidential appointments of also-rans by eliminating the need for a system of consolation prizes for powerful challengers. In the previous arrangement, these politicians incurred in significant risks when dealing with the low probability of doubling the other coalition’s vote shares and winning both seats in a $M=2$ district. Because of the non-trivial possibility of losing, they were enticed to run with a fallback strategy of being appointed in the cabinet, or as a representative of the executive power in a region, or even as an ambassador abroad.

Arguably, the new electoral system took most of those incentives away, and we were presented with the opportunity to compare the situation before and after the reform. Despite mixed descriptive evidence, statistical analyses show that the second Piñera administration – the first one after the electoral reform passed in 2015 – continues to appoint legislative also-rans using a similar strategy than past governments, even under a different electoral system. Across both periods, presidents have picked former losing candidates that have shown strong electoral performance, and especially those candidates who ran in Senate seats.

These results suggest that losing candidates are not electoral afterthoughts, but rather a key component of elections. In fact, they are so important that parties develop strategies to reward a significant group of them after working for the benefit of their coalitions, whether as challengers in a future election, or as part of a new presidential team. At the same time, we showed that the effect of the binominal electoral system on
the scheme of consolation prizes has been over-stated, and also-rans of quality are still being rewarded today despite experiencing electoral defeat.

Future avenues for research call for an expansion of the analytical framework, including qualitative data techniques to complement these results. A natural step forward from our quantitative research is to interview former hopefuls who were not able to secure office at one point in time but were considered by the insurance policy system for good losers and were appointed by a president. Similarly, also-rans who eventually won office can detail their experiences and complement what the results of this project showed.

An exploration of this type can help confirm these two dimensions as pivotal to parties in the development of new strategies for losing candidates. Or, conversely, it can help bring light to new factors, unexplored in this project, that are important determinants of the fate of also-rans. We can think of more informal links between candidates and parties that are also important in their future chances to compete for a legislative seat, like having worked for a party for a number of years, or networking with party officials.

Likely, other quantifiable factors can be in the mix when explaining the strategies of re-nomination for candidates and parties. Another step forward involves the collection of more correlates like campaign finances, the careers of candidates before politics, and more socio-demographic indicators. Collection of these numbers for losing candidates is not well kept in Chile, particularly in the first handful of elections, but the literature has been consistent in finding a correlation between money and votes, as well as with the past of a candidate.
With that said, we hope this to be the start of a more systematic study of electoral losers across elections and over time. Not only because we get to see many politicians return to politics and become important policymakers across levels of government, but also because they complete the analytical picture presented by every elections process. Currently, we are lacking all the knowledge we could have to understand why losers come back, and to predict the chances of repeating for promising politicians who could eventually become important contributors to a democracy.
References


Appendix

For chapter 3, we develop a few models as robustness checks. First, as an extension to the model presented in the chapter, we add interactions between electoral performance and electoral experience. In addition, we add a variable that captures losers of elections who obtained a higher vote share than eventual winners. This particularity is possible given the electoral system that counts votes by parties/coalitions instead of by individual candidates. Finally, we leave the coalition and year effects – used but not shown in the chapter models – in these models.

This model shows that, compared to retired candidates, the first loser differential is a significant correlate for candidates who end up being re-nominated. This is similar in the case of also-rans who switch districts within the same chamber. Similarly, electoral experience is a significant variable for all four outcomes, with a local winner increasing their chances to move back to local elections after losing in the legislature, but also becoming important for losing candidates that end up re-nominated. In turn, and compared to retired also-rans, being a veteran affects positively the chances for candidates to seek a higher election seat and to change districts.

**Table A.1: Full logistic regression models with determinants of four outcomes for losing candidates, Chilean legislative elections 1989-2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Re-nomination</th>
<th>Higher election</th>
<th>Within-chamber district change</th>
<th>Retired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First loser differential (FLD)</td>
<td>0.0655***</td>
<td>-0.0525</td>
<td>0.0267</td>
<td>-0.0381***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Winner</td>
<td>0.734*</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0.0355</td>
<td>-0.973***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran</td>
<td>-0.194</td>
<td>1.779***</td>
<td>0.406</td>
<td>-0.0237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local winner * FLD</td>
<td>0.0533</td>
<td>0.00185</td>
<td>0.0534</td>
<td>0.0115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

141
These full models present interactions between candidate performance and experience, but they do not hold statistical significance across the four outcomes. Additionally, the variable that marks losers who obtained more votes than an eventual winner is also lacking significance, despite having the expected signs. With that said,
the variables of interest still correlate significantly, with the first loser differential being a deterrent of retirement, while fostering re-nomination efforts. The combination of performance and a capital city district is also significant for the chances of a district change within the same chamber, while performance is a strong correlate for higher-election seeking.

Moving on, we include another outcome for also-rans into our models and run a multinominal logistical regression with the category of retirement from electoral politics as the baseline. Thus, we compare the determinants of retirement to the four other outcomes: moving to a local election after defeat without coming back to the legislature, to changing districts within the same chamber, to seeking a higher election seat, and to being re-nominated for the same seat in the next election.

The table below shows that compared to also-rans who retire, losing candidates who over-perform electorally have a greater chance of re-nomination to the same seat in the next election. Similarly, electoral experience plays a significant role, because previous local winners have a greater likelihood of re-nomination, despite electoral defeat. Experience is also significant for higher election seat seekers, and for candidates who change districts, both compared to retiring losers.

Likewise, and compared to losing candidates who retire, local winners have a higher likelihood of going back to local elections after their adventures in the legislature. Then, candidates in the capital have a greater chance of switching districts within the chamber, and a lower probability of re-nomination for the same seat in the next election.
Table A.2: Multinominal logistic regression for determinants of four outcomes for losing candidates, baseline outcome is retirement from electoral politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>To local election</th>
<th>Within-chamber district change</th>
<th>Higher election</th>
<th>Re-nomination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First loser differential (FLD)</td>
<td>0.0121</td>
<td>0.0305*</td>
<td>-0.0127</td>
<td>0.0919***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Winner</td>
<td>1.405***</td>
<td>0.475</td>
<td>1.039</td>
<td>0.971***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran</td>
<td>-0.0435</td>
<td>0.760***</td>
<td>1.256***</td>
<td>-0.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital city dummy</td>
<td>-0.175</td>
<td>0.946***</td>
<td>0.684</td>
<td>-1.154***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital * FLD</td>
<td>-0.00591</td>
<td>0.0212</td>
<td>0.0103</td>
<td>-0.0592***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>-0.241</td>
<td>-0.581**</td>
<td>0.279</td>
<td>0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>-0.512</td>
<td>-0.210</td>
<td>0.715*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>-0.796***</td>
<td>-0.138</td>
<td>-0.750</td>
<td>-1.350***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiatus</td>
<td>-0.148</td>
<td>-0.00389</td>
<td>-0.387</td>
<td>0.406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertación</td>
<td>-0.680*</td>
<td>0.164</td>
<td>-1.368*</td>
<td>-1.199***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza</td>
<td>-0.223</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>-1.785**</td>
<td>-0.807*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite coalitions</td>
<td>0.857**</td>
<td>0.918</td>
<td>-0.497</td>
<td>0.0968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>-0.194</td>
<td>-0.0152</td>
<td>-0.945**</td>
<td>-0.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>0.188</td>
<td>-0.276</td>
<td>-0.552</td>
<td>-0.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-0.0208</td>
<td>-0.378</td>
<td>-1.082**</td>
<td>-0.926***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>-0.0193</td>
<td>-0.458</td>
<td>-0.983**</td>
<td>-0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>-0.371*</td>
<td>-1.413***</td>
<td>-1.781***</td>
<td>0.0626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.701*</td>
<td>-2.012**</td>
<td>-1.958**</td>
<td>0.0251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1.890</td>
<td>1.890</td>
<td>1.890</td>
<td>1.890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.0741</td>
<td>0.0741</td>
<td>0.0741</td>
<td>0.0741</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Finally, we develop a third set of models including fixed effects. Given that this technique explores within-subject variation, retirement is not a proper outcome for a model like this. However, regressions done with the `xtreg` command in STATA allow for cases to remain in the model. Below is the set of models including year and coalition effects, as well as fixed effects. Time-invariant variables like the sex of the candidate are dropped automatically by the software.

**Table A.3: Fixed-effects linear model for the determinants of four outcomes for losing candidates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Re-nomination</th>
<th>Higher election</th>
<th>Within-chamber district change</th>
<th>Retired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First loser</td>
<td>0.00925**</td>
<td>-0.00361*</td>
<td>-0.00105</td>
<td>-0.00415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>differential (FLD)</td>
<td>(0.00373)</td>
<td>(0.00214)</td>
<td>(0.00399)</td>
<td>(0.00397)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Winner</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.109</td>
<td>-0.318*</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.162)</td>
<td>(0.0929)</td>
<td>(0.173)</td>
<td>(0.172)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veteran</td>
<td>-0.425***</td>
<td>0.0289</td>
<td>-0.149***</td>
<td>0.338***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0501)</td>
<td>(0.0287)</td>
<td>(0.0536)</td>
<td>(0.0533)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital city dummy</td>
<td>-0.141</td>
<td>0.0770</td>
<td>-0.0698</td>
<td>0.0278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital * FLD</td>
<td>-0.00515</td>
<td>0.00131</td>
<td>-0.00245</td>
<td>0.0122**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00604)</td>
<td>(0.00346)</td>
<td>(0.00646)</td>
<td>(0.00642)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent</td>
<td>0.307***</td>
<td>0.0495</td>
<td>0.00210</td>
<td>-0.227**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0934)</td>
<td>(0.0535)</td>
<td>(0.0998)</td>
<td>(0.0993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senate</td>
<td>-0.0578</td>
<td>-0.455***</td>
<td>-0.117*</td>
<td>-0.0220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0617)</td>
<td>(0.0353)</td>
<td>(0.0659)</td>
<td>(0.0655)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiatus</td>
<td>0.426***</td>
<td>0.0343</td>
<td>0.124*</td>
<td>-0.171**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0657)</td>
<td>(0.0376)</td>
<td>(0.0702)</td>
<td>(0.0697)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top place but lost</td>
<td>0.269***</td>
<td>-0.0421</td>
<td>-0.101</td>
<td>-0.230**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0977)</td>
<td>(0.0559)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concertación</td>
<td>-0.0806</td>
<td>-0.0256</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>-0.0858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.196)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.209)</td>
<td>(0.208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alianza</td>
<td>0.0635</td>
<td>0.0958</td>
<td>0.0382</td>
<td>-0.227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
<td>(0.0801)</td>
<td>(0.150)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satellite coalitions</td>
<td>-0.0596</td>
<td>0.0295</td>
<td>0.160</td>
<td>-0.0760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.132)</td>
<td>(0.0754)</td>
<td>(0.141)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>0.0100</td>
<td>-0.0780**</td>
<td>0.00252</td>
<td>0.147**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0603)</td>
<td>(0.0345)</td>
<td>(0.0644)</td>
<td>(0.0640)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>-0.0141</td>
<td>-0.0978**</td>
<td>-0.0876</td>
<td>0.148*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0748)</td>
<td>(0.0428)</td>
<td>(0.0799)</td>
<td>(0.0795)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-0.0409</td>
<td>-0.166***</td>
<td>-0.175*</td>
<td>0.318***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These models support the strength of electoral performance as a correlate for also-rans eventually landing a re-nomination for the same seat, but the significance of this variable is lacking in the retirement outcome. Likewise, the significance is also lacking for veteran candidates in the model for a higher election outcome, as well as the interaction between a capital city district and the first loser differential for the model featuring a within-chamber district change.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Constant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0865)</td>
<td>(0.0495)</td>
<td>(0.0925)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>-0.151***</td>
<td>-0.329***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0961)</td>
<td>(0.0550)</td>
<td>(0.103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.00860</td>
<td>-0.195***</td>
<td>-0.325***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.0642)</td>
<td>(0.120)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.304**</td>
<td>0.0892</td>
<td>0.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.131)</td>
<td>(0.0748)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.373</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of groups</td>
<td>1,675</td>
<td>1,675</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1